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Abstract 
This thesis is a philosophical analysis of the epistemic role of scientific data in 
biomedical research. It is comprised of an introduction (Chapter 1), three arti-
cles (Chapter 2, 3, 4) and a conclusion (Chapter 5). I use a case study approach 
and focus on the epidemiology of the ‘exposome’, a new line of research based 
on a reconceptualisation of exposure and the use of new and diverse datasets. 
I argue that data can sustain the subject matter of exposome research by shap-
ing concepts, strategies, techniques and what counts as evidence. Yet, the epis-
temic role of data is enacted by the ways in which it is used by epistemic agents 
and thus constantly connected to and mediated by other artefacts, components 
and features of scientific inquiry. In Chapter 2, I discuss the innovations and 
changes of the exposome. I argue that these should be framed as the establish-
ment of a repertoire, as opposed to a paradigm. The exposome repertoire con-
sists in many components transferred from other areas of the life and health 
sciences: thus, scientific change is the result of the alignment of these compo-
nents and it is not due to only one of these factors, such as data. In Chapter 3, I 
discuss data practices in exposome research. I argue that researchers use evi-
dential claims to specify the evidential and representational value of datasets. 
Three strategies for evidential claims can be distinguished, differing in terms 
of level of abstraction, lines of work and type of evidential claim and leading 
to a picture of evidence production as epistemic-intensive labour. In Chapter 
4, I discuss how data is classified as evidence in exposome research, in the con-
text of philosophical discussions of the types of evidence used for causal claims 
in biomedical research. I argue that molecular data collected in exposome re-
search is used to study differences and dependences, as opposed to mecha-
nisms; more generally, the classification of a dataset as a type of evidence is 
dependent on the ways in which the data is used, rather than its intrinsic prop-
erties. 
Keywords: Philosophy of epidemiology; Data; Evidence; Exposome; Scientific 
change.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: a Data-Centric Study of the 
Exposome 
This dissertation is about the collection, integration and use of scientific data. 
It studies scientific data as a focus to understand research in contemporary ep-
idemiology. The dissertation empirically reconstructs the conditions under 
which data is created, handled and employed, pointing to the material, meth-
odological, theoretical and technological constraints that characterise research 
about the relation between the environment and health. 
Disease and health in human populations are deeply affected by various types 
of interactions with external entities in their surrounding environments, to the 
point that the vast majority of disease risks is related to differences in the envi-
ronment (Rappaport and Smith 2010). Research on these issues is therefore 
very significant from a societal and political standpoint, is highly funded and 
is supposed to deliver evidence for policy-making. At the same time, this is 
highly complex research. The environment influences human health and dis-
ease through a variety of different pathways, which may involve significantly 
different phenomena, contexts and components, take place in diverse locations 
and temporalities, are often difficult to track and measure, and need to be stud-
ied at various scales and levels of abstraction. In turn, research projects in this 
area are carried out in an interdisciplinary context, which lies in between the 
life and health sciences and thus comprises diverse epistemic cultures, such as 
molecular biology, genetics research, animal research, etc. This implies a com-
plex organisation of research, requiring: the collection and dissemination of 
evidence from and to various sources; the support of institutions, funding bod-
ies and industry; and managing platforms and structures allowing for ex-
changes and collaborations at an interdisciplinary level.  
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The primary context for the study of the ways in which disease states are re-
lated to and are shaped by environmental factors is the discipline known as 
epidemiology, which studies the distribution and determinants of health and 
disease (Morabia 2015; Broadbent 2013). For this dissertation, I have studied a 
specific approach that has emerged in the last decade of epidemiological re-
search and is presented as a way of overcoming some of the complexities of the 
issues at stake. The ‘exposome’ is the totality of all exposures to environmental 
elements that are experienced by individuals (Wild 2005). Here, totality is 
firstly meant to include all the exposures experienced throughout a lifetime. 
Thus, at any point in an individual’s lifetime, their exposome will comprise all 
the exposures experienced from conception onwards: for instance, the expo-
some of an adult individual includes exposures in utero, which may have an 
impact on their health only at a later stage (Robinson and Vrijheid 2015). Sec-
ondly, totality is meant to comprise all the various elements, substances and 
processes that an individual is exposed to at a single point in time, both at an 
external and internal level. In other words, to study an individual exposome 
requires the study of various levels of investigation, from the macroscopic, ex-
ternal component to microscopic, individual elements (Rappaport 2011). At a 
given point in time, an individual’s exposome comprises exposures to external 
elements at a general, specific and internal and individual level (Rappaport 
and Smith 2010). The concept was first introduced by Christopher Wild (Wild 
2005), in an attempt to shift attention to the need of better and more precise 
exposure assessment and integrate various ideas and approaches to the study 
of the relation between environmental exposure and disease under an um-
brella concept (Wild 2012). In the last decade, the concept has increasingly been 
applied in epidemiology, to the point that large bodies like the European Union 
have funding streams dedicated to the exposome (Vineis 2018). 
The overarching question of this dissertation is the following: in which ways 
does data inform and sustain the subject matter of epidemiological research on 
the exposome? In order to answer this question, I study the role of data as an 
artefact that is produced on the basis of, and in turn used to generate, scientific 
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knowledge in exposome research.1 This research question leads me to the anal-
ysis of more specific issues. I start by looking at the historical background in 
which the exposome was developed. I ask the following question: what consti-
tutes the subject matter of exposome research from a conceptual, material, and 
social point of view and which is the role of data in shaping these components? 
I discuss this issue in the context of philosophical discussions on what consti-
tutes change in current scientific research (Chapter 2). Further focusing on sci-
entific innovations and their relation with data, I analyse data practices in con-
temporary research on the exposome. I ask the following question: how are 
diverse data sources handled, integrated and used, and in which ways concep-
tual, methodological and material assumptions influence data integration? I 
position this question as a contribution to current philosophical analyses of 
data and evidence integration in the sciences (Chapter 3). In the context of dis-
cussions on evidence, I investigate approaches to evidence classification in the 
study of the exposome. I ask the following question: how is evidence distin-
guished and classified in exposome research and how does data shape 
knowledge claims about specific aspects of the exposome? I analyse this topic 
in the context of philosophical and scientific discussions on the classification of 
medical evidence (Chapter 4). 
This ‘data-centric’ philosophical study is based on the empirical study of a spe-
cific research project on the exposome, EXPOsOMICS. The project run between 
2012 and 2017 and applied the exposome approach to the assessment of disease 
risk related to air and water pollution, by studying external and internal com-
ponents of the exposome (Vineis et al. 2017a). The project was chosen on the 
basis of an initial study of the philosophical literature on scientific data and 
online and literary analysis of publications, reports and funding applications 
of exposome research. The choice was motivated by my philosophical interest 
 
1  I give further details on my research questions in the following subsec-
tions (see 1.1.2). 
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in scientific research that is considered highly interdisciplinary, innovative and 
based on the collection, integration and use of many different sources of data. 
I decided that I would focus on the research of a single project, as this allowed 
me to specify my questions and sample, while at the same time obtaining a 
good representation of state of the art research on the exposome. EXPOsOM-
ICS was the last in a series of projects that has been carried out by a group of 
research centres, guided by the Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics 
of Imperial College London, that has been very successful at securing funding 
from the European Union. In addition, research of this group has been the fo-
cus of recent work in philosophy of science (Russo and Vineis 2017; Vineis et 
al. 2017b). 
In what follows, I detail the broader context where I conduct my study and I 
present my research questions (Sect. 1.1). I then specify the methodology used 
in this dissertation (Sect. 1.2). I conclude by presenting the structure and con-
tent of the dissertation (Sect. 1.3). 
1.1 Data, Big Data and Scientific (Big) Data 
The word ‘data’ is increasingly present in the public sphere, from discussions 
in the media to policy reports and all the way to academic debates. In most of 
these discussions, the notion of data is associated with the adjective ‘big’, thus 
forming the phrase ‘big data’, to refer to the increasing amount of data pro-
duced, stored and used for various purposes. Big data is presented as a result 
of a number of phenomena and processes occurring in modern societies, 
whereby the increasing use of digital devices, software and online platforms 
has established activities that have the production of data as one of their main 
steps, if not their aim and endpoint.  
As a notion, yet, big data is vague and has received many critiques by scholars. 
The notion was introduced between the mid 1990s and the early 2000s in the 
computing industry (Diebold 2012). At the time, big data was defined on the 
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basis of three traits: large volume, high velocity and wide variety. This defini-
tion, which is also known as the 3Vs, was picked up in various areas of the 
industry and especially in the business sector, where it is still extensively used 
(Kitchin and McArdle 2016). Yet, the 3Vs have been extensively criticised by 
scholars from different fields, to the point that some have argued that it has 
only increased confusion around big data. According to the Rob Kitchin and 
Gavin McArdle:  
The 3Vs meme is actually false and misleading and along with the 
term itself is partially to blame for the confusion over the defini-
tional boundaries of Big Data. (Kitchin and McArdle 2016, p. 9) 
In contrast with the 3Vs, many other definitions have been introduced and dis-
cussed, adding various dimensions and traits to the notion of big data. It has 
been argued that definitional aspects of big data include: exhaustivity, as big 
data can arguably capture and document entire systems; fine-grained resolu-
tion, because big datasets can arguably be as detailed as possible in the descrip-
tion of a phenomenon; relationality, since big datasets are arguably easy to in-
tegrate.2 At the same time, scholars have underlined how a dataset that is con-
sidered big data in a context might not in another context, as a result of the 
relational character of the predicate ‘big’ and the diversity of areas where data 
is produced and used (Floridi 2012). Therefore, what is considered big data 
varies significantly in terms of both attribution and ontological characteristics, 
as different types of data constitute different ‘species’ of (big) data (Kitchin and 
McArdle 2016).  
On top of discussions about how to properly define big data, why is big data 
something that we should discuss and care about? An answer to this question 
is that the increase in quantity of data collected, processed and used is routinely 
 
2 See Kitchin (2013, 2014a) for a detailed discussion of these and other def-
initions. 
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associated with revolutionary changes, paradigm shifts and substantial disrup-
tions in various contexts, from the economy  to social interactions, from politics 
to entertainment. This has given rise a certain rhetoric around big data, which 
extends narratives of the benefits of innovation, revolution and ’disruption’ 
that are typical of the high-tech sector. In academic debates, this rhetoric has 
led to a broad and interdisciplinary debate where several claims about the ben-
efits, power and features of large datasets have been analysed, assessed and 
criticised. As part of a debate that has become known as critical data studies, 
scholars from various disciplines including sociology, philosophy, science and 
technology studies, information systems and history have criticised various 
claims of the big data rhetoric (Iliadis and Russo 2016; Kitchin and Lauriault 
2018). For instance, scholars have questioned the claims that more data neces-
sarily leads to more objective and accurate claims (boyd and Crawford 2012) 
and that big data allows for complete descriptions of phenomena and can thus 
do without sampling and bias issues (Kitchin 2013) or ethical considerations 
(Simon 2015).  
In the context of this debate, scholars have significantly focused on the impact 
of big data for the scientific context, because various claims of the big data rhet-
oric have discussed scientific research (Kitchin 2014b). In the sciences, data has 
always been a cornerstone of the scientific method, at least since the beginning 
of modern science. At the same time, however, the amount of data scientists 
can collect, analyse and use has increased significantly in recent years, espe-
cially in connection to the development and employment of computing tech-
nologies that can collect, store and process large datasets. Between the end of 
the 2000s and the early 2010s, it was famously claimed that data-intensive ap-
proaches were bringing about a fourth scientific revolution (Hey et al. 2009; 
Bell et al. 2009), as a consequence of which scientific theories were going to be 
superfluous (Anderson 2008) and correlations were going to triumph over 
causal knowledge and reasoning (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). As a 
consequence of the epistemological nature of these claims, philosophers of sci-
ence started to engage in the debate on these issues, pushing back against the 
view that the use of large datasets in the scientific context was bringing about 
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revolutionary changes to scientific epistemology (Leonelli 2012a). In this con-
text, philosophers of science have for instance argued against claims according 
to which data-intensive methods are an instance of theory-free science 
(Callebaut 2012), can be based on correlations only and do without causal 
knowledge (Pietsch in preparation), counter issues such as bias and over-
sampling (Leonelli 2014) and are a historical novelty in the sciences (Müller-
Wille and Charmantier 2012; Strasser 2011).  
Most of the ‘novelty claims’ connected to the collection, processing and use of 
large datasets have thus been subject to effective criticism in the philosophical 
literature. I would argue that this has been the first step of the debate on data, 
a pars destruens that has been followed by a pars contruens phase. In this second 
phase, philosophers of science have started to pay attention to data as a philo-
sophically interesting element of scientific methodology, practice and episte-
mology more generally. Sabina Leonelli (2013) has argued that one of the nov-
elties related to large scientific datasets is the new emphasis placed on the role 
of data as commodities with crucial scientific, economic, social and political 
values. Similarly, I would argue that the big data rhetoric has sparked the in-
terest of philosophers of science in data, as epistemic elements of scientific epis-
temology that should be included in philosophical analyses of the sciences. 
This is the context where I carry out my research in this dissertation, as I focus 
on data as the main units of my philosophical analysis. This is also why in the 
dissertation I analyse the collection, processing and use of data, but I rarely use 
the phrase ‘big data’, in an attempt to try to move away from the rhetorical 
tools used in big data narratives. In the dissertation, I discuss issues that have 
arisen in the context of what I called the first phase of the debate (such as trans-
formations and changes in science due to data). Still, I intend my research to be 
located in current philosophical attempts at making sense of data as an element 
of scientific epistemology that: is something that deserves philosophical atten-
tion per se; and has key connections to other elements of scientific epistemol-
ogy that have more traditionally been discussed in philosophy of science, such 
as knowledge, models, phenomena and evidence. In the next subsection, I give 
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further details about the theoretical background of the research conducted in 
this dissertation.  
1.1.1 Data Studies in Philosophy of Science: Data as 
an Epistemically Salient Artefact 
The increasing emphasis placed on data in public debates has thus led to an 
increase in interest and research on data in philosophy of science. Philosophers 
have studied scientific data in the context of both innovative data-intensive ap-
proaches and more traditional settings. That scientific data is of paramount im-
portance for scientists has always been quite evident, not only to philosophers. 
Data is one of the primary objects researchers interact with; its production, col-
lection and analysis are daily activities in scientific projects; questions about 
the quality of data are at the constant centre of scientific research; and data can 
often be one of the main outputs of scientific projects.  
Still, philosophers have historically paid little attention to data in their re-
search. Lack of interest in data can be connected to traditional approaches in 
philosophy of science and more particularly propositional, theory-centric and 
syntactic views of science.3 According to these views, the goal of science is to 
produce propositions that can be organised in theories. Accordingly, what re-
ally matters in science is the justification of these propositions and theories. In 
this context, non-propositional components of science are important only inso-
far as they are related to the justification of claims and theories. As a result, 
non-propositional components of scientific research, such as instruments, 
methods, models and data are considered of little importance and their role is 
discussed only insofar as they may be involved in the justification of the truth 
 
3 See Suppes (1976) and Winther (2016) for introductions on these ap-
proaches. 
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of a claim. With the shift from syntactic and semantic accounts of science to 
pragmatist views (Suppes 2000), philosophers of science started to focus on 
scientific research not just as a way of justifying claims and theories, but also 
of understanding, explaining and intervening on the world (Bailer-Jones 2009, 
pp. 126-158). In this context, philosophers started to pay attention to experi-
mentation, models, understanding and values (Hacking 1983; Morgan and 
Morrison 1999; Douglas 2009). Still, scientific data was not a key component of 
these analyses, as data was mostly mentioned in connection with other topics, 
such as visualisation, analysis and interpretation through models or theories. 
The topic of data emerged mostly in the context of the focus on experimenta-
tion, as philosophers started to discuss the relation between experimental 
traces, data and evidence (Hacking 1983; Rheinberger 1997; 2010). Similar dis-
cussions can be found in science studies more generally, especially science and 
technology studies (see e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979; Bowker 2005; Bowker 
and Star 1999) and the history of science (Chang 2004; Strasser 2012). Studies 
of historical and contemporary sciences revealed a number of challenges to re-
ceived philosophical views of the role of data in the sciences. Philosophers 
highlighted that the same scientific data can be interpreted in significantly dif-
ferent ways by the same or other research groups, which presents a challenge 
to the idea of data as a mere enabler of the justification of scientific claims and 
theories (Bogen and Woodward 1988).  
In the context of renewed interest in data in the sciences, philosophers have 
confronted these traditional views and built alternative approaches. Much of 
this work has been carried out in parallel with novel philosophical interest in 
scientific practice, where data plays a crucial and constant role.4 Philosophers 
have analysed the practices involved in the collection, handling, curation and 
 
4 I  give more information on philosophical studies of scientific practice in 
the next section (especially Sect. 1.2.1), where I discuss the methodology of 
the dissertation.  
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storing of data for sharing and re-use within a specific scientific community, 
with the aim of critically engaging with the big data rhetoric as well as improv-
ing philosophical understanding of the epistemic role of data. For instance, Le-
onelli has extensively documented data practices in the last three decades of 
the life sciences, focusing on model organism and the setting up of community 
databases in this context (Leonelli 2016a). Scholars have underlined that a sig-
nificant portion of time, effort and funding is now dedicated to the storing and 
dissemination of data in assemblages and infrastructures like databases, in or-
der to allow for the re-use of data by various actors in the research community 
and beyond (Leonelli 2013a). In addition, the increasing emphasis on data as a 
very significant output of research in itself has been highlighted, with reference 
to the establishment of new journals and other publications focused on pub-
lishing data only (Leonelli 2013b). The aims of these analysis have had to do 
with improving philosophical understandings of scientific practice centred on 
data, documenting practical and methodological issues, and emphasising and 
distinguishing epistemic strategies designed and applied by researchers (Leo-
nelli 2012b; Leonelli 2013c; O’Malley and Soyer 2012; Green et al. 2018). This 
line of research has led to more specified and nuanced accounts of the innova-
tive dimension of the use of large datasets in the sciences (Leonelli 2014).  
Furthermore, philosophers have studied the relations between data and com-
ponents of scientific research that have traditionally been considered crucial 
elements of scientific epistemology. In this context, causality and causal rea-
soning have been among the most discussed topics. This is connected to one of 
the main tenets of the big data rhetoric, according to which the vast number of 
correlations found in large datasets undermines the need for causal analysis 
and reasoning (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). For example, Pietsch and 
Illari and Russo have explored the nature of causal inference based on large 
datasets, on the basis of case studies from biomedicine and social sciences, un-
derlining the ever more significant role that causal reasoning plays in these 
areas of research (Pietsch 2015a; 2014; Illari and Russo 2016a; 2016b).  
The role of data has also been discussed in the context of the debate on what is 
known as the ‘theory-ladenness’ of scientific experimentation, within which 
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philosophers discuss how much theory influences the ways in which scientists 
carry out experiments (Burian 1997; Steinle 1997). As part of this debate, Koray 
Karaca has for example focused on the large datasets collected and used in high 
energy physics, distinguishing between data-driven, theory-driven and exper-
imental procedures in data selection (Karaca 2013; 2017). 
In addition, data has been discussed with the aim of understanding what con-
stitutes it as a specific component of scientific research. According to an intui-
tive view, data has a representational and informational content, which is fixed 
and mind- and context-independent; in this view, data plays the role of provid-
ing evidence for phenomena and giving empirical content to claims, models or 
theories (Bogen and Woodward 1988; Woodward 2000). This representational 
approach has been challenged by philosophical analyses focused on data prac-
tices, and primarily by Leonelli’s account of data, which highlights how, in 
contemporary data practices in the life science, the evidential value and repre-
sentational content of data depend on the context in which data is used, rather 
than on its intrinsic and predetermined properties (Leonelli 2009; 2015; 2016a). 
In this view, data is a crucial element of epistemology, rather than a philosoph-
ically uninteresting by-product of scientific research. As a result of this debate, 
philosophers have also been interested in the relations between data and com-
ponents of scientific epistemology such as models (Green et al. 2018; MacLeod 
and Nersessian 2018; Leonelli 2019).  
A final line of research on data that I want to highlight here has focused on the 
(largely construed) ethical dimension of data practices in the sciences. These 
discussions have been elicited by both concerns over the increasing use of data 
in society more generally, as well as a philosophical debate that has gained in 
prominence in recent philosophy of science, i.e. the role of values and trust in 
science (Douglas 2009; Wilholt 2013; Longino 2015). Philosophers have ex-
plored issues related to responsibility and accountability (Leonelli 2016b; 
Rieder and Simon 2016), openness and divides (Levin and Leonelli 2017; Leo-
nelli et al. 2017) and more general ethical frameworks (Simon 2015).  
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This area of current research in philosophy of science, which I call data-centric 
philosophy of science, is the context where I conduct my own research in the dis-
sertation. Works in data-centric philosophy of science have thus been con-
cerned with questions about: the relation of data and data practices with ele-
ments the cognitive and epistemic dimension of scientific research, including 
explanations, theories and models; the influence that data and data practices 
can have on and receive from other elements of scientific epistemology; the 
production of data as scientific artefacts and the relation with the material di-
mension of the sciences, including technology and methods; and the nature 
itself of scientific data, in the relation with interactions with the world, phe-
nomena and empirical knowledge. The focus of data-centric philosophy of sci-
ence is data and data practices, broadly construed and including data collec-
tion, storing, analysis, use, dissemination, etc. Depending on the specific con-
text, what counts as data in the first place may vary substantially and ‘scientific 
data’ may be physical samples, digital files, analogue documents, etc. As a con-
sequence, the specific units of philosophical analysis of data studies may 
change accordingly, potentially including the ways in which data is collected 
and modified, structured and ordered, and more generally used as evidence 
for various claims. The philosophical aims of data-centric philosophy of sci-
ence include: the description and documentation of data practices in the sci-
ences; the critical engagement with assumptions, concerns and underlying is-
sues of scientific data; and the philosophical interpretation of the context of 
data from the perspective of conceptual tools from philosophical work.5 
At the conceptual centre and basis of this line of research is a specific view of 
the epistemic role of data in science. In this dissertation, with the term ‘data’, I 
refer to both objects produced by the interaction of researchers with an object 
 
5 I will come back to these features of data-centric philosophy of science 
when discussing methodology and normativity in the next section (see Sect. 
1.2.1). 
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of investigation (such as samples and materials) and their subsequent pro-
cessing and manipulation (affecting e.g. format, medium and order). In this 
view, the epistemic value of data as a source of information, evidence and 
knowledge, is the result of various practical, methodological and conceptual 
interactions and considerations that take place at various levels of research. In 
line with Leonelli (2016), the use of a dataset as evidence for knowledge claims 
is dependent on these interactions and considerations, and not only on the in-
trinsic properties of the dataset (such as the method through which it was pro-
duced, its format, size, etc.). This entails that practices of data collection, pro-
cessing, integration and use are not just about extracting objective, fixed and 
context-independent information, but have a significant and specific epistemic 
character.  
Following this approach, I view data as an epistemically salient artefact of scien-
tific research, in the sense that it is the result of epistemically salient scientific 
practices and sits in epistemically salient relations with other products and 
components of scientific epistemology, such as theories, models and 
knowledge (Leonelli 2019). As a consequence of these features, using data as 
units of philosophical analysis provides a window into the interrelations be-
tween cognitive and material aspects of scientific research. This does not mean 
that data plays a more important role than models, theories or knowledge. But 
it implies that the practices, processes and researchers involved in the collec-
tion, integration and use of data have a specific epistemological significance, 
one that deserves a specific as much as models, theories or knowledge do. This 
is why, in this dissertation, I will be interested in the conditions and ways in 
which data collected in biomedical research are processed, integrated and used 
as evidence by epidemiologists, as epistemically significant aspects of research 
that shape and influence the study of health, environment and their relation. 
1.1.2 A Data-Centric Study of the Exposome 
In the expanding context of data-centric philosophy of science, the research of 
this dissertation is about the collection, integration and use of data in the life 
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and health sciences. A significant part of the recent philosophical scholarship 
on data has focused on this area, for a number of reasons. First, in the philo-
sophical literature these disciplines have often been discussed as particularly 
fragmented, with highly diverse communities, approaches, methodologies, 
theories, styles of explanation, commitments and goals. These pluralistic fea-
tures of the life and health sciences have been discussed by historians and phi-
losophers of science in the context of the debate on reduction, unification and 
integration. For instance, philosophers have argued that different theories in 
biology cannot be unified nor reduced to more fundamental ones (Mitchell and 
Dietrich 2006); the use of diverse methods, models and representations is cru-
cial in a number of areas of the life sciences (Mitchell and Gronenborn 2015); 
many questions and problems require explanations developed in different bi-
ological disciplines and with different scientific aims (Brigandt 2013); and the 
disunity of the life and health science is an inevitable condition (Dupré 1996).  
As a result of this fragmentation, scientific data in this context can refer to many 
different objects, is of significantly different types, is collected by different com-
munities, for different purposes and with diverse commitments. This elicits 
questions about the ways in which diverse data sources can be interpreted, an-
alysed and used as to constitute a single body of evidence. At the same time, 
data is an interesting example of integration and diversity in the life and health 
sciences and provides a significant window into the commitments, assump-
tions and aims of diverse communities (Leonelli 2013c). In addition, the life 
and health sciences present an interesting case in which the standardised pro-
duction of large volumes of data has often been mentioned as a potential game 
changer (Weinberg 2010; Golub 2010), but practices of data handling, storing 
and analysis have strong continuity with longstanding approaches (Müller-
Wille and Charmantier 2012; Strasser 2012; Leonelli 2016b). In this sense, data 
also sits at the crossroads of many current trends of the field, especially in the 
biomedical sciences. For example, personalised medicine (also known as pre-
cision medicine), i.e. the attempt to take into account individual variables into 
the study and prevention of disease, is largely built on the assumption that the 
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use of large datasets “can account for an increasing number of factors that in-
fluence health and disease, and that these data can be used to stratify the pop-
ulation and health problems according to various characteristics” (Green and 
Vogt 2016, p. 106). Similarly, the molecularisation of medicine, i.e. study and 
treatment of disease from a molecular point of view (Boniolo and Nathan 2017), 
and postgenomics, i.e. the attempts of going beyond gene-centric approaches 
(Stevens and Richardson 2015), are largely based around the use and integra-
tion of new datasets, at different levels of abstraction and at increasing vol-
umes. And the classification of evidence into a hierarchy of research designs 
developed in the context of evidence-based medicine, which has been exten-
sively criticised in philosophy of science for the omission of crucial types of 
evidence (Worrall 2002; Clarke et al. 2013), can be considered a push for certain 
data sources over others.  
As part of this context, I specify my data-centric study of the life and health 
sciences context by looking at current research in epidemiology on what is 
known as the exposome. I choose to focus on epidemiology for a number of 
reasons. First, epidemiology is an interesting case to look at because it follows 
the fragmented nature of other disciplines in this context, using approaches 
and methods from the medical, biological, environmental and statistical sci-
ences (Broadbent 2013). In addition, epidemiology is particularly interesting 
from a data perspective. While, epidemiologists have traditionally been con-
cerned with the collection and analysis of large datasets (Morabia 2005), the 
availability of new sources of data and new analytic tools are often presented 
as a significant novelty, especially in the context of issues at the interface of 
environment and health (Fleming et al. 2017; Leonelli and Tempini 2018).  
In this context, I focus on research on an approach and notion that has been 
introduced in the last decade: the exposome. The exposome is defined as the 
totality of individuals’ exposures to environmental elements (Wild 2005). The 
notion is often presented as a new paradigm for the study of the relation be-
tween health and the environment (Rappaport and Smith 2010). The exposome 
is a way to describe and characterise the totality of environmental exposures. 
This ‘all-encompassing’ approach is considered and presented as innovative 
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because it distinguishes and includes different levels of exposure, including 
generic external (e.g. social capital, education, financial status), specific exter-
nal (e.g. radiation, infectious agents, chemical contaminants and environmen-
tal pollutants, diet) and internal exposure (e.g. oxidative stress, metabolism, 
inflammation, ageing).  
As a line of epidemiological research, the exposome is relatively new and 
young and key questions about how the exposome should be defined and stud-
ies are currently discussed in the field. As a consequence, exposome research 
allows me to analyse contemporary research where new concepts are devel-
oped and applied in practice. In addition, this allows me to analyse from a 
philosophical perspective scientific research that is in a flux and unsettled state, 
where conceptual and methodological discussions are at the centre of the de-
bate. These features of the exposome also enable me to engage in discussions 
on innovations and changes in the sciences in general and in connection to the 
debate on the impact of data in particular. On these issues, I ask this research 
question: what constitutes scientific change and innovation in the context of 
the exposome? In order to tackle the question, I then focus on the following 
questions: What is the conceptual, material and methodological background of 
the exposome? What is the role of data in shaping theoretical, material, social 
and infrastructural components of scientific research and bringing about 
change? In answering these questions, I make a contribution on philosophical 
debates on change in contemporary biomedical research and provide a thor-
ough analysis of the exposome as a ‘paradigm’ for epidemiology (see Chapter 
2). 
The exposome presents an interesting case where data from many and signifi-
cantly diverse sources of evidence are gathered, including: cohort studies, col-
lecting data on populations of interest over a long period of time with ques-
tionnaires, retrieval of physical samples (e.g. blood, cord blood, urine), and fol-
low-up; secondary analysis of primary evidence, including omic analysis to 
quantify and study the effects of exposure at the level of different molecular 
processes; experimental studies measuring exposure and responses to expo-
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sure at an individual level, through wearable and tracking devices; and envi-
ronmental studies, producing data on air and water pollution through moni-
toring stations, geo-spatial models and individual estimates. As a consequence, 
I consider exposome research as a case study in the integration, handling and 
use of large datasets. I ask this as my research question on these issues: how 
are large datasets handled, integrated and used as evidence in exposome re-
search? This leads me to tackle the following questions: Which modes, strate-
gies and approaches have arisen and are employed for the study of the expo-
some? In which ways do epistemic and non-epistemic commitments and as-
sumptions influence the integration of diverse types of data? I ask this question 
in the context of philosophical discussions on modes and strategies of data in-
tegration in the sciences, especially the life and health sciences, and to paint a 
picture of data and evidence production as epistemically intensive activities 
(see Chapter 3).  
I study these issues by looking at data in a specific project of exposome research 
known as EXPOsOMICS and funded by the European Union. The project fo-
cused on the assessment of disease risk, and chronic disease more particularly, 
involved in the exposure to air and water pollution, applying the exposome 
approach through the study of external and internal components (Vineis et al. 
2017a). The study of a specific research project specifies my questions and 
claims and allowed me to focus on research that was in progress. In addition, 
this focus gives empirical grounding to my philosophical analysis (as I detail 
in Sect. 1.2). Funding from the European Union was connected to ongoing re-
vision of quality standards of air and water pollution and points to the need 
for scientific evidence for policy-making. In relation to these questions, I tackle 
the following question: what types of evidence are produced in the context of 
exposome research? This leads me to ask the following, more specific ques-
tions: How is data used in claims about aspects of the exposome? Which types 
of evidence does molecular data provide? I ask these questions from the point 
of view of philosophical, scientific and policy discussions about the evidence 
produced in medicine. I contribute to these issues with a new case study of 
research from an underrepresented discipline like epidemiology and hint at 
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philosophical discussions on the relation between evidence and data (see 
Chapter 4).  
1.2 Methodology: Qualitative Case Study Re-
search and Empirical Grounding in Philoso-
phy of Science in Practice 
My research is empirically-informed philosophy of science, based on a quali-
tative case study of data in epidemiology. The methodology of this dissertation 
is based on three main elements: it draws on work in the practice turn in science 
studies and, more specifically, the approach known as philosophy of science in 
practice; it is an instance of case study research in philosophy of science; and it 
uses data collected through qualitative research to empirically ground philo-
sophical claims. In the next subsections, I detail each of these elements in turn.  
1.2.1 Following the Practice Turn: Philosophy of 
Science in Practice 
When introducing and discussing data studies in philosophy of science, I have 
mentioned that philosophical work on data has been carried out in the context 
of increasing attention to scientific practice. Many philosophers have discussed 
this increase as a significant change in philosophy of science, and more pre-
cisely as a “practice turn” leading to a philosophy of science in practice (Soler 
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et al. 2014).6 While there is no general agreement on what the practice turn 
consists in, there are a few defining aspects that need to be considered and are 
particularly important for my own work. At a minimum, the philosophy of 
science in practice consists in philosophical studies of scientific practice. But 
why is this a turn? The reason lies in the aforementioned propositional views 
of science, which in Anglophone and analytic philosophy of science have tra-
ditionally regarded the sciences as bodies of propositions and have subse-
quently focused on the truth-value and logical relationships of these proposi-
tions, usually as sets of propositions organised in scientific theories (Chang 
2015). In this tradition, practice has been largely disregarded because it belongs 
to the non-verbal and non-propositional dimension of science (Ankeny et al. 
2011).  
In going beyond this tradition, the analysis of scientific practice as the focus of 
the philosophy of science in practice leads to significant methodological con-
sequences, which Soler and colleagues discuss in terms of specific “shifts” 
(Soler et al. 2014, pp. 14–24).7 Firstly, the focus on practice entails a shift from 
the study of scientific products to the study scientific processes. As a result, one 
of the goals of the philosophy of science in practice is the development of de-
scriptively adequate and empirically based accounts of the sciences, as op-
posed to a priori accounts that are typical of syntactic and semantic ap-
proaches. This is closely related to another feature of the practice turn, which 
consists in a shift from decontextualised, general and macroscopic account to 
 
6 My discussion of the practice turn is limited to philosophy of science, but 
as argued by Soler and colleagues this turn has concerned science studies 
more generally (Soler et al. 2014, pp. 1-3). 
7 Soler and colleagues list six shifts. For the purpose of the presentation of 
my own work, I discuss four of them, as the other two concern philosophical 
analyses of the history of science and experimental activities. 
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“adopting a local scale of analysis and paying close attention to the specific con-
texts in which scientific results are produced, used, and disseminated” (Soler 
et al. 2014, p. 18; emphasis in original). As I detail in the remainder of this sec-
tion, these shifts have critical consequences of the methodology of philosophy 
of science, as they push for the inclusion of empirical methods from social and 
historical sciences as a way of studying scientific practices. Another aim of the 
philosophy of science in practice is the documentation of aspects of scientific 
practice that are contingent of a specific situation and are normally left out of 
final scientific outputs, which is a shift from traditional philosophical methods 
such as retrospective, rational reconstructions. In this way, the focus on prac-
tice leads to a picture of science as the complex result of multi-faceted, contex-
tual, variable and intertwined processes, with a move away from idealised ac-
counts.8  
My dissertation follows the practice turn in philosophy of science with the 
choice of focusing on scientific activities and agents involved in the use of data, 
which makes my research a philosophical study that focuses on scientific prac-
tice, rather than on propositional products of scientific research. Data studies 
in philosophy of science are closely linked to this shift, since data is a crucial 
element of scientific practice and this is one of the reasons why it is tradition-
ally considered irrelevant in philosophy of science. Following the practice turn, 
I ask open-ended questions about the ways in which data may inform and sus-
tain the subject matter of epidemiological research on the exposome. The start-
ing point of my research is thus not an idealised account, and I do not presup-
pose modes of inquiry, strategies and goals employed by scientists. I engage 
 
8 As highlighted by Bschir and colleagues (Bschir et al. 2018), the philoso-
phy of science in practice is one on the many and new approaches of current 
philosophy of science, and as such it should not be seen as a rejection of all 
the other approaches and traditions in the field. 
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with my case study with the aim of building an account of the practices in-
volved in the collection, analysis and use of data in exposome research. On the 
basis of this account, I discuss the case at a more theoretical level, by either 
engaging with conceptual notions discussed in philosophy of science (e.g. evi-
dence, scientific change) or providing conceptual distinctions of data practices 
(e.g. epistemic strategies, commitments and issues; relations between the cog-
nitive and material dimensions of scientific practice).  
Thus, the main goal of the dissertation is largely descriptive, as I aim for an 
empirically adequate account of the use of data in epidemiological research on 
the exposome. The normative and descriptive features of philosophical re-
search are among the most debated issues of the philosophy of science in prac-
tice, and are indeed discussed by Soler and colleagues as one of the shifts that 
characterise the practice turn (Soler et al. 2014, pp. 15-16; see also Lynch 2014). 
Namely, in this context, philosophers have often taken a descriptive approach, 
aimed at making sense of what scientists do in the first instance. Normativity 
in philosophy of science in practice has been interpreted in terms of a critique 
of certain scientific practices or the ways in which they are discussed in the 
sciences, philosophy and beyond, with the aim of developing and providing 
normative guidance that may help do better science in specific contexts of in-
vestigation (Wimsatt 2007, Chap. 2-3). In this dissertation, I do not present a 
critique of data practices of exposome research, nor do I offer specific recom-
mendations on ways to improve them. I do engage in discussions at a more 
normative level, but these are not aimed at the ways in which scientists work, 
as much as at the ways in which their practices have been discussed in philo-
sophical, sociological and popular accounts of the sciences. In this sense, the 
normative character of my dissertation can be seen in the fact that I present my 
own position on these discussions and views, my own perspective on the phe-
nomenon that I study, my own distinctions of what the phenomenon consists 
 Introduction: A Data-Centric Study of the Exposome 
 22 
in and my own assessment of how significant this phenomenon is for other 
components of scientific epistemology.9  
1.2.2 Case Study Research 
At the basis of the philosophy of science in practice is an appreciation of the 
heterogeneous nature of scientific practice. This, in turn, implies that philoso-
phers employ various approaches to the study and analysis of scientific prac-
tice. In this dissertation, I have followed a specific approach based on a quali-
tative case study of a specific scientific project. This choice is grounded on 
methodological discussions in the philosophy, history and social studies of sci-
ence.  
According to Wolfgang Pietsch (2016), case studies can be defined as detailed 
analyses of episodes and their context: they may be analysed with various 
methods (empirical investigations, statistical analysis, archival work, etc.); and 
are always case studies for something, in that the episode and its context are 
analysed from the perspective of specific question, concept or phenomenon. 
As a consequence, case studies are a crucial aspect of the history and philoso-
phy of science because they “provide the essential link between the history and 
the philosophy of science” (Pietsch 2016, p. 49). Unsurprisingly, much of the 
discussion on case studies has taken place in the history of science, where case 
studies are often used as the main objects of research (Chang 2011). More gen-
erally, in philosophy of science case studies can provide grounding to philo-
sophical considerations about various aspects of scientific epistemology; offer 
challenges and counterexamples to philosophical considerations; and enable 
philosophers to discover new phenomena and develop ways of accounting for 
them. Pietsch distinguishes between two modes of reasoning with case studies 
 
9 See similar conclusions drawn by Leonelli (2016, p. 9). 
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in the sciences and the humanities: a predictive mode, with the goal of predict-
ing other episodes similar to the case study; and a conceptual mode, with the 
goal of answering questions about the conceptual framework used to analyse 
and account for the phenomena in the case study. Beyond methodological rea-
sons for why case studies are used in philosophy of science, Adrien Currie 
(2015) argues that there are historical reasons driving their use in the field. Cur-
rie distinguishes between three roles played by case studies in philosophical 
methodology: as inductive evidence for general claims; for pragmatic and rhe-
torical purposes, as ways to ground a philosophical debate; and as ways to test 
the success of philosophical reconstructions of scientific practice and concepts.  
In the research of this dissertation, I follow a moderate version of Pietsch’s con-
ceptual mode and Currie’s view of case studies as tests for philosophical re-
constructions of scientific practice and concepts. My primary interest is to map 
the use of data in exposome research and to understand it by introducing and 
discussing philosophical accounts of the role of data in scientific research. In 
this sense, I do not start from preconceived accounts of data practices, but from 
the empirical reconstruction of my case study, and get to the conceptual level 
on the basis of this empirical evidence. This use of case studies is grounded in 
philosophical analyses of the use of case studies in the social sciences. In her 
analysis of case study research in the social sciences, Mary Morgan has pre-
sented a definition of the case study according to which the unit of analysis of 
case studies is “a bounded whole object of analysis” (Morgan 2012, p. 668). In 
this view, case studies aim at analysing whole processes, events, or evidence 
(as opposed to the focus on specific aspects or bits of evidence) and in continu-
ity with their context. Moreover, case studies are open-ended, as there are no 
preconceived limits on the amount of work, specificity of the topic and separa-
tion between subject and context. Case studies also require the study of “a ‘real-
life’ whole”, which implies extensive engagement with the subject and collec-
tion of evidence on a variety of different aspects (Morgan 2012, p. 668). As a 
result, the output of case study research is a “complex, often narrated, account 
that typically contains some of the raw evidence as well as its analysis and that 
ties together the many different bits of evidence in the study” (Morgan 2012, p. 
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668). Another element highlighted by Morgan is that case studies may not be 
used only for theory or hypothesis testing, but rather for the development of 
"evidence-based concepts" and for “revealing phenomena and developing ac-
counts of them” (Morgan 2012, p. 671).  
In my case study research in the dissertation, I draw on these insights and I 
engage with real-life processes of research in EXPOsOMICS. I aim at analysing 
data practices as Morgan’s whole processes, as I follow the ways in which data 
is collected, integrated and used as evidence and I situate them in a broader 
material, social and epistemic background. By closely looking at scientific pro-
cesses and their context and building what can be considered a microscopic 
and local account (Soler et al. 2014, p. 18), I also draw inspiration from work in 
feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. In this line of research, phi-
losophers view knowers as constantly “situated in particular relations to what 
is known and to other knowers”, which implies that “what is known, and the 
way that it is known, thereby reflects the situation or perspective of the 
knower” (Anderson 2017). As a metaphilosophical and methodological impli-
cation of this view, philosophers have argued for the need of situated accounts 
of scientific knowledge, aimed at locating epistemic practices, agents and 
knowledge in the material, institutional, and cultural context of their stand-
point (Haraway 1988; Wylie 2012; see also Leonelli 2016a, p. 190). I thus take a 
bottom-up approach to my case study, in which discussions of issues at a con-
ceptual level are based on empirical accounts of the case I discuss. As a conse-
quence, I discuss and introduce what can be considered Morgan’s evidence-
based concepts, such as the “exposome repertoire” (see Chapter 2, briefly in-
troduced in the next section) and “evidential claims” (see Chapter 3, briefly 
introduced in the next section).  
As a result, the output of my case study research presents both descriptive and 
conceptual components. In this sense, I do not use my case study with the aim 
of general or universal results: rather, I aim at discussing concepts at a 
‘mesoscopic’ level, that is adapted and grounded in a specific context (Pietsch 
2016; Burian 2011). I further rely on Pietsch’s idea of case studies being always 
case studies for something, as I take the exposome to be a case study of the use 
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of data in contemporary epidemiology and the ways in which data practices 
inform and sustain its subject matter. In this sense, my case study can thus be 
considered to have a “use-value” (Morgan 2019) that is connection to compar-
isons with other contexts and cases, to build “bridges” between similarities 
(Morgan 2014, pp. 1015-1016), and to strengthen the compelling character of a 
case that has been the focus of other philosophical research.  
1.2.3 Empirical Methods for Philosophers: Qualita-
tive Interviews 
According to Bschir and colleagues: 
Philosophers of scientific practice typically identify as naturalist 
philosophers whose methods are continuous with those of the sci-
ences. As a consequence, methods from the arsenal of the social sci-
ences have become more and more integrated into the philosophy 
of science, blurring the boundaries between philosophy of science 
and sociology of science. (Bschir et al. 2018) 
In my case study research on data in exposome research, I have relied on meth-
odologies from social science research to collect evidence on scientific practices. 
The use of empirical methods from the historical or social sciences is a recent 
addition to philosophy of science methodology and is a crucial aspect of the 
practice turn and the philosophy of science in practice, in whose context it is 
 Introduction: A Data-Centric Study of the Exposome 
 26 
discussed as one of the main ways to “acquire insights into and evidence of 
scientists’ research behaviour” (Boumans and Leonelli 2013, p. 260).10  
For this dissertation, as a result of the choice of case study, I decided to employ 
empirical methods to study data in the context of EXPOsOMICS. Only very 
little of data is discussed by scientists in their publications and presentations, 
which made it necessary to directly engage with EXPOsOMICS researchers. 
Using an approach that is often applied in the context of philosophy of science 
in practice (Osbeck and Nersessian 2015) and philosophical studies of data 
practices (e.g. Leonelli 2010a, pp. 120-122), I carried out qualitative interviews 
with EXPOsOMICS researchers. Methods such as qualitative interviews are 
used when social scientisats are interested in gaining insight into the ‘worlds’ 
of others, i.e. how participants view, experience or conceptualise an aspect of 
social life (Flick 2014, Chap. 13). The interviews were semi-structured, with a 
list of specific topics to cover that was flexible regarding the order and phrasing 
of the questions (Kelly 2010). They were based on an approach called “in-
formed observation”, which Laudel and Gläser define as follows: 
With “informed observation” we refer to social studies of science 
undertaken by sociologists who acquire a scientific understanding 
of the field they study by self-education prior to or at the beginning 
of their empirical study. (Laudel and Gläser 2007, p. 95)  
In the literature, this approach is connected to the notion of interviewing as a 
social interaction and performance that generates new knowledge, as a result 
of a communication process where the meaning of questions and answers is 
 
10 The integration of empirical methods in philosophical analyses has also 
kickstarted discussions about methodology in philosophy of science, a topic 
that traditionally has not received detailed consideration in the field. See, for 
example, the discussion of case studies in the previous subsection and, more 
generally, Wagenknecht and colleagues (Wagenknecht et al. 2015). 
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built jointly by interviewers and interviewees (Laudel and Gläser 2007, p. 98). 
An understanding was necessary for my observations because I wanted to get 
into the details of the data employed by EXPOsOMICS researchers. Another 
argument that is often used for informed interviewing is that being informed 
demonstrates the competence of interviewers and helps with being taken seri-
ously. In my research, I would argue that this has not played a particularly 
important role, as my preliminary knowledge of exposome research often 
could not get into the specifics of data practices. As a result, many of the ques-
tions I asked were aimed at understanding which data practices are carried 
out, which types of data and meta-data are involved, which methods are used 
to collect and stored data, which assumptions are underlying these steps and 
how these are perceived and discussed by EXPOsOMICS researchers. Ques-
tions were thus based on my knowledge of exposome research and the philo-
sophical issues I was interested to tackle.  
I conducted five interviews. Participants were recruited on the basis of the sug-
gestions of the principal investigator of EXPOsOMICS and following a snow-
ball method. Interviews lasted around an hour and were audio-recorded, fol-
lowing consent by participants. All the interviews took place at the Department 
of Epidemiology and Biostatistics of Imperial College London, UK, where I 
was hosted for a week in January 2017. During the week, I did some participant 
observation through informal discussions with researchers and by attending a 
weekly meeting of the group. The background, skillset and role in the project 
of the interviewees varied, including molecular biology, statistics, epidemiol-
ogy and medical science. I argue that this provided me a good representation 
of the work of EXPOsOMICS.  
In the months following the fieldwork, I transcribed and analysed the inter-
views and I took the data collected through the interview as providing the em-
pirical grounding of my philosophical analysis. I made a list of excerpts and 
themes that emerged from the interview transcripts and developed in the 
course of my analysis. This included: types of data used in EXPOsOMICS; the 
management of large datasets and modes of data integration; the current land-
scape of innovations in epidemiology; the concept of the exposome and 
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changes to other approaches and foundational notions of epidemiology; inter-
disciplinarity and collaboration in contemporary science. In carrying out the 
interviews, my interest was to gain an understanding of the ways in which data 
is used in the project. At the same time, I did not take what interviewees said 
only at face value, as I connected their claims with publications and reports of 
exposome research. Throughout the dissertation, when I discuss insights or in-
formation from the interviews, I provide references to published articles, as a 
way of giving further grounding to my claims. In addition, I gave my own 
philosophical interpretation to the material I collected from the interviews. 
Namely, the main claims of the subsequent chapters were based on a mix of 
input from the interviews data, the philosophical literature and my own anal-
ysis. The claims that I present in the dissertation are my own, as for example I 
did not discuss the notion of repertoire (Chapter 2), evidential claims (Chapter 
3) and evidential pluralism (Chapter 4) directly with the interviewees.  
1.3 Overview of the Chapters  
My dissertation consists of this introductory chapter, three articles that I repro-
duce as the main chapters of the dissertation11, and a concluding chapter. The 
articles all focus on data in the context of epidemiological research on the expo-
some, that I have accounted for on the basis of empirical research on the 
 
11 I reproduce the articles in their current publication or submission form. 
Turning articles into chapters, I have only edited page, section, footnote, fig-
ure and table numbering and referencing (i.e. a reference to Section 1 in article 
form is now a reference to Section 1.1, the phrase "In this paper I will" has 
been changed to "In this chapter I will", etc.). Following university regula-
tions, I have not made any other change to the content of the articles. This 
creates some repetition of references and premises across the central chapters, 
as these are primarily intended to function as stand-alone articles. 
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EXPOsOMICS project. I present an account of how data practices are aligned 
to and inform the cognitive, material and social dimensions of scientific re-
search on these issues.  
I start by providing an account of the conditions under which the exposome 
was conceived, developed and established in epidemiology, in Chapter 2 “The 
Exposome as a Postgenomic Repertoire: Exploring Scientific Change in Con-
temporary Epidemiology”.12 
I start by discussing the ways in which the exposome has been introduced 
(Wild 2005). The exposome is a way to describe and characterise the totality of 
environmental exposures. This ‘all-encompassing’ approach is considered and 
presented as highly innovative because it distinguishes different levels of ex-
posure, including generic external (e.g. social capital), specific external (e.g. en-
vironmental pollutants) and internal exposure (e.g. oxidative stress). As such, 
it has been presented as a new “paradigm” in the scientific literature (Rap-
paport and Smith 2010). However, I show that the paradigm framework does 
not work here, because: the exposome has strong continuity with longstanding 
approaches in epidemiology and environmental science; and the plurality of 
exposome approaches, solutions and procedures lacks the theoretical coher-
ence of paradigms. Instead of a new paradigm, I argue that the innovations of 
the exposome are better captured by an account of the exposome as a repertoire. 
The repertoire framework has recently been introduced in the philosophical 
literature as a way to understand scientific change beyond traditional ap-
proaches like Kuhnian paradigms (Ankeny and Leonelli 2016). A repertoire is 
the result of the alignment of conceptual, institutional, material, technological, 
organisational and economic elements of scientific research.  
 
12 This chapter will be submitted for publication in an academic journal at 
a later stage. 
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In the repertoires framework, scientific change may happen when a new rep-
ertoire is developed, components of a repertoire change or when a repertoire 
is re-instantiated in another context and varied. I use this feature of the frame-
work to show that the exposome is the result of the merging of elements from 
three other lines of research: the sequencing repertoire, which emerged in the 
genomic context and shares with the exposome repertoire technical, concep-
tual and funding elements; exposure science, which studies human contact 
with external agents and shares with the exposome repertoire interdisciplinary 
approaches and teams, the conceptualisation of the internal components of ex-
posure and rhetorical tools from risk assessment; biomarkers research, which 
shares with the exposome repertoire laboratory techniques and conceptualisa-
tions of disease. I show that the exposome approach is the alignment of these 
components, which are repurposed for new audiences, as well as newly intro-
duced components and elements. 
As a second step, I use the repertoires framework to draw an account of scien-
tific innovations in the exposome and argue that the exposome is a post-
genomic repertoire. I use the term here with a historical meaning, i.e. as a way 
to describe research that employs genomic-based technologies, is increasingly 
aware of the complexity in interpreting genomic results and has a critical en-
gagement with gene-centric approaches (Stevens and Richardson 2015). The 
historical use of the term postgenomic leads me to a nuanced account of scien-
tific change. First, in the context of conceptual consequences of the exposome, 
I focus on the notion of environment. I argue that the pluralistic approach to 
conceptualising and operationalising the environment in the exposome is in 
continuity with traditional epidemiology and can hardly be seen as a paradig-
matic change. Second, I focus on technical innovation of the exposome and I 
discuss the role of data. Discussions on data are another context where scien-
tific change has been discussed recently, as many have argued that paradig-
matic changes are due to increasing quantities of data used in the sciences. My 
account of the exposome as a repertoire points to the alignment of data with 
other ingredients of the repertoire. While the availability of new and different 
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types may lead to the revision of notions like environment and exposure, these 
changes are due to the alignment of various components, rather than only data. 
On the basis of this initial analysis of the background conditions of the expo-
some, I present an empirical reconstruction of data practices employed and 
aligned with the other ingredients of the repertoire. In Chapter 3 (“Making Ev-
idential Claims in Epidemiology: Three Strategies for the Study of the Expo-
some”13), I closely analyse the data practices involved in exposome research 
and show how different epistemic strategies have arisen in this context.  
I start by introducing the main theoretical tool I use in the article: evidential 
claims. I view evidential claims as claims that identify the datasets that are to 
be used as evidence for the investigation of phenomena. I draw inspiration 
from philosophical inquiries on archaeology, where evidential claims are dis-
cussed as the main results of archaeological research (Chapman and Wylie 
2016; Wylie 2017). Using the notion, I highlight that different types of eviden-
tial claims are generated at different stages of exposome research and through 
different approaches, methods and lines of work. I claim that various aspects 
of exposome research can be interpreted as relying on or building towards ev-
idential claims, beyond the explicit claims made by EXPOsOMICS researchers. 
In particular, I distinguish three epistemic strategies. The macro strategy iden-
tifies the initial evidence platform, generating scoping claims that restrict the 
sample and provide an initial understanding of the phenomena to focus on. As 
part of the micro strategy, significantly different kinds of data are collected, 
with the common aim of identifying structure at microscopic level and elabo-
rating evidential claims about microscopic structures. On the basis of the evi-
 
13 This chapter is currently under revision and being considered for publi-
cation by Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 
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dential claims generated by the first two strategies, the association level pro-
vides evidential claims at the statistical level, concerning associations between 
exposure to the environment and outcomes of interest. 
I argue that these strategies are a crucial step of research, where datasets are 
given value and representation content through evidential claims. They differ 
in terms of level of abstraction, line of work and type of evidential claim, and 
are ways of dealing with the increasing complexity and diversity of datasets. 
In addition, I argue that viewing data practices from the perspective of eviden-
tial claims and distinguishing strategies for evidential claims yield significant 
insights. It enables to unpack the epistemic issues and challenges that concern 
each strategy and, in turn, influence research done at a different stage. It gives 
a characterisation of the context of data practices in terms of evidential claims, 
which shows how much epidemiological research is not necessarily about 
causal claims, but neither is to be overlooked as producing ‘raw data’.  
Furthermore, I argue that this focus on evidential claims provides a new per-
spective on epidemiological research. Firstly, in the context of discussions on 
epistemic changes related to data, while some of these strategies present a nov-
elty that is closely related to the availability of large datasets, I paint a picture 
of evidence production as epistemic-intensive labour, in contrast to views of 
big data shaping scientific research towards automatic and theory-free ap-
proaches. Secondly, I contrast my approach with existing philosophical ac-
counts of epidemiology, that have vastly focused on causality and causal infer-
ence (e.g. Broadbent 2013). I argue that it would not be charitable to interpret 
all epidemiological research as primarily concerned with causality or to focus 
only on causal claims. An analysis based only on causality focuses for the most 
part on the end results of epidemiological research and may thus end up over-
looking the crucial epistemic role of other elements and claims that proceed 
final results but make them possible and significantly influence them. Investi-
gating the role of data and evidence in epidemiology as one of the central out-
puts and results of research enables to shed lights on these issues, which are 
particularly important in the context of life and health sciences contributing to 
evidence used in policy. 
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In the context of discussions on evidence, in Chapter 4 (“Evaluating Evidential 
Pluralism in Epidemiology: Mechanistic Evidence in Exposome Research”14), 
I connect my analysis of data practices in exposome research with philosophi-
cal accounts of evidence and evidence classification. In current discussions on 
evidence in the medical sciences, epidemiology has been used to exemplify a 
specific version of evidential pluralism. According to this view, known as the 
Russo-Williamson Thesis, evidence of both difference-making and mecha-
nisms is produced to make causal claims (Russo and Williamson 2007). This 
approach has been employed to describe the types of evidence that are pro-
duced in epidemiological and, more specifically, exposome research (Russo 
and Williamson 2012; Russo and Vineis 2016). 
In the chapter, I analyse approaches to evidence classification in exposome re-
search and I cast doubt on the extent to which evidential pluralism holds in 
this case. I start by focusing on the claim that molecular data allows for the 
production of mechanistic evidence. According to Russo and Vineis (2016), 
exposome research can produce – and it does not only use – mechanistic evi-
dence, and that this production is to be seen in the molecular features of expo-
some research. Within the Russo-Williamson Thesis framework, mechanistic 
evidence is evidence of the existence of mechanisms, evidence that is about 
mechanism and has mechanisms as its' object. Following Illari and Williamson 
(2012), mechanisms evidence thus refers to evidence of the entities, activities 
or the way these are organised to produce the phenomenon for which the 
mechanism is responsible. I thus closely analyse data practices in the context 
of molecular data in exposome research, by looking at omics data and exposure 
profiles. I argue that molecular evidence has been used for claims about the 
 
14 This chapter is published in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 
41(4). 
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difference that exposures make, which is in contrast with the notion of mecha-
nistic evidence proposed by the Russo-Williamson Thesis. I therefore caution 
against interpretations in terms of mechanistic evidence.  
Then, I focus on another aspect of the Russo-Williamson Thesis, i.e., the way 
evidence is classified and distinguished between different kinds. I expand my 
critical remarks on the thesis by empirically reconstructing data practices in 
EXPOsOMICS and addressing the conditions under which data is categorised 
as evidence in exposome research. I argue that these show that the classifica-
tion of a dataset as a type of evidence is dependent on the ways in which the 
data is used and therefore researchers may have substantially different views 
and approaches to what counts as a type of evidence. This is in contrast with 
the approach used by evidential pluralism, where evidence is classified in dif-
ferent types on the basis of intrinsic properties of the type of evidence and a 
specific type of evidence is usually linked to a specific method used for the 
generation of evidence. In these views, data counts as evidence on the basis of 
properties that are fixed, inherently local and stand in a representational rela-
tion with aspects of reality, independently of the context where the data is 
used. I compare and contrast this approach to relational accounts of data, 
where data is taken to be a relational notion with a non-representational char-
acter (Leonelli 2016a, pp. 69-92).  
Finally, I come back to what I consider the core of the thesis and suggest that 
exposome research, and epidemiology more generally, indicate different inter-
pretations of evidential pluralism and its applicability in the health sciences. I 
propose an interdisciplinary and use-based interpretation of the thesis, which 
takes into account the critical points I have raised in the chapter. Additionally, 
it tries to push the thesis forward, towards a direction where it is capable of 
accounting for the use of data as evidence in current research and can therefore 
make fitting suggestions on the consideration and appreciation of a plurality 
of medical evidence. 
Finally, Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the dissertation. I introduce and 
discuss the main themes discussed in the dissertation, including the epistemic 
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role of data, the epistemic-intensive character of evidence production and the 
status of empirical knowledge and data in contemporary research. I conclude 
by presenting an outlook of this research and pointing to topics that have been 
explored in the dissertation but will require more research. I discuss the notion 
of evidence and compare my characterisation of data practices in exposome 
research with conceptualisations of the notion in the philosophical literature. 
Similarly, I reflect on what counts as disease and health in epidemiological re-
search and contrast these approaches to more traditional views and accounts 
in the literature on the philosophy of the life and health sciences. 
The dissertation concludes with Appendices related to my empirical research, 
including a copy of the consent form. 
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Chapter 2 
The Exposome as a Postgenomic Reper-
toire: Exploring Scientific Change in 
Contemporary Epidemiology 
 
Abstract: In the last decade, a new concept has emerged in epidemiology: the 
‘exposome’, defined as the totality of exposures experienced by individuals. 
The concept is often presented as a new paradigm for the study of the relation 
between health and the environment. In the chapter, I analyse the conditions 
under which the exposome was conceived, developed and established. I argue 
that these point to the establishment of an exposome repertoire, not a para-
digm. I use this framework to show the alignment of the epistemic elements of 
the exposome with material, financial, institutional and technological factors. I 
argue that some of these factors were transferred from other areas of the life 
and health sciences, including sequencing, exposure science and biomarkers 
research. I then analyse the conceptual and material innovations of the expo-
some through the lens of broader discussions in the context of the life and 
health sciences, by arguing that the exposome can be considered a postgenomic 
repertoire. 
2.1 Introduction 
In the last decade, a new concept has emerged in the context of epidemiological 
research: the ‘exposome’. The exposome is defined as the totality of individu-
als’ exposures to environmental elements. This includes the various internal 
and external elements and substances an individual is exposed to at any given 
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time, as well as the different exposures that individuals experience throughout 
their lifetime (Wild 2005). For instance, studying the effects of air pollution 
through the exposome involves studying health outcomes at the population 
level, air pollution at the environmental level, as well as internal exposure at 
the molecular level. The concept is usually presented as a new “paradigm” for 
the study of the relation between health and the environment (Rappaport and 
Smith 2010).  
In this Chapter, I analyse the conditions in which the exposome was conceived, 
developed and established in the wider context of the life and health sciences. 
I argue that, rather than a new paradigm, these conditions point to the estab-
lishment of a ‘repertoire’, where epistemic and conceptual elements are aligned 
with material, financial, institutional and technological factors. I draw on Ra-
chel Ankeny and Sabina Leonelli’s repertoires framework, which is aimed at 
broadening traditional views of scientific change and capturing the role of ele-
ments of scientific research that have usually been overlooked in the philo-
sophical literature. I use the repertoires framework to specify the role of mate-
rial, technological and institutional components in the development of the 
exposome. This specification allows me to draw connections between many of 
these components and other disciplines or repertoires in life and health science 
research. Furthermore, I discuss the changes brought about by the introduction 
of the exposome repertoire by arguing that it can be considered a postgenomic 
repertoire, whose innovative status is to be seen in continuity with other ap-
proaches in the field. 
My analysis of the exposome repertoire is grounded in the study of publica-
tions, reports and presentations in the scientific literature on the exposome; as 
well as empirical research that I carried out in the context of a particular expo-
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some project, EXPOsOMICS, which included a series of interviews with expo-
some researchers.15 I proceed as follows. I start by introducing the concept of 
the exposome and the ways in which it has been presented in the literature. I 
argue that the exposome has been established as a repertoire and I specify its 
material, social and epistemic components (Sect. 2.2). I then argue that three 
traditions played a crucial role in the development of the exposome repertoire 
though the transfer and modification of its components: the sequencing reper-
toire, biomarkers research and exposure science (Sect. 2.3). Thus, I analyse the 
innovations of the exposome through the lens of broader discussions in the 
context of the life and health sciences. I argue that the exposome can be consid-
ered a postgenomic repertoire, which leads me to discuss conceptual and ma-
terial forms of innovation (Sect. 2.4).  
2.2 Using Repertoires to Understand the 
Exposome 
The term ‘exposome’ was first introduced by Christopher Paul Wild in 2005, 
with an article that appeared on Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers and Prevention 
with the title “Complementing the genome with an “exposome”: The outstand-
ing challenge of environmental exposure measurement in molecular epidemi-
ology” (Wild 2005). Wild characterised the exposome as a way of describing 
the totality of environmental exposures that individuals are exposed to in their 
life-course. The exposome was to “encompasses life-course environmental ex-
posures (including lifestyle factors), from the prenatal period onwards”, as a 
 
15 EXPOsOMICS ran between 2012 and 2017 and applied the exposome ap-
proach to the assessment of disease risk related to air and water pollution, by 
studying external and internal components of the exposome (Vineis et al. 
2017).  
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“highly variable and dynamic entity that evolves throughout the lifetime of the 
individual” (Wild 2005: 1848).  
The exposome is a way to describe and characterise the totality of environmen-
tal exposures, including exposures horizontally and vertically: all the environ-
mental exposures experienced at any given point in life, at both the internal 
and external level (horizontal perspective); and all exposures experienced by 
individuals, from their conception onward (vertical perspective). In the field, 
this ‘all-encompassing’ approach is considered and presented as highly inno-
vative. Innovation here is connected to going beyond the traditional study of 
exposure in epidemiology, that focused mostly on the external level of expo-
sure by measuring the presence and interaction with environmental elements 
and chemicals. The exposome, instead, distinguishes between different levels 
of exposure: generic external exposure (social capital, education, financial sta-
tus, psychological and mental stress, urban–rural environment, climate, etc.); 
specific external exposure (radiation, infectious agents, chemical contaminants 
and environmental pollutants, diet, lifestyle factors, occupation, medical inter-
ventions, etc.); and internal exposure (metabolism, endogenous hormones, 
body morphology, physical activity, gut microflora, inflammation, lipid perox-
idation, oxidative stress, ageing, etc.). Exposure is measured through different 
types of sampling, including: indirect sampling through proxies that can be 
correlated to otherwise unmeasurable variables of generic external exposure 
(e.g. eligibility for free school meals as a proxy for socio-economic status); sam-
pling of sources of specific external exposure, through specific-measurement 
campaigns (e.g. air and water pollution); and sampling of molecular markers 
of presence or effects of internal exposure (e.g. molecular analysis of blood 
samples).  
On this basis, the goal of the approach is to identify associations between these 
different components, as a way of studying disease as it develops through the 
different levels and moves through potential pathways. For example, The 
EXPOsOMICS project studied the relation between exposure to ultrafine par-
ticles and asthma, on the basis of pollution estimates of ultrafine particles de-
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rived from air quality measurements and metabolomic analyses of internal ex-
posures from blood samples (Jeong et al. 2018). The investigation showed a 
strong association between some ultrafine particles and adult-onset asthma. 
Moreover, through the focus on internal exposure, it identified metabolic path-
ways which are associated with both air pollutants and health outcomes and 
could be considered to mediate the effects of air pollution on disease. The in-
clusion of this internal perspective, that is considered a component of the expo-
some and thus a type of exposure as important as the external ones, is seen as 
one of the innovations of the exposome (Rappaport and Smith 2010). Beyond 
the inclusion of the internal component of exposure, the simultaneous study of 
different levels of exposure and chemicals at the same time is considered inno-
vative in contrast to the traditional focus on single chemicals or single types of 
exposure. Finally, the all-encompassing approach is also a way of implement-
ing a life-course and dynamic approach, thus moving away from measure-
ments at single points and towards an understanding of issues of exposure and 
disease as developing dynamically throughout lifetime.  
In presentations, introductions and discussions of the exposome, the term ‘par-
adigm’ is often used. The exposome has been presented as: “a new and exciting 
paradigm for improvement and integration of currently scattered and uncer-
tain data on the environmental component in disease aetiology” (Vrijheid 2014, 
p. 876); an “operational paradigm” for exposure science (Rappaport 2011, p. 5); 
a “paradigm shift” for public health (Juarez et al. 2014, p. 12868); a new “re-
search paradigm” for environmental epidemiology (Stingone et al. 2017, p. 
316), planetary health (Logan et al. 2018) and biomonitoring (Dennis et al. 
2017). In philosophy of science, the term paradigm was introduced and popu-
larised by Thomas Kuhn (1962). Kuhnian aradigms are the “shared commit-
ments of a scientific group” (Kuhn 1977, p. 294), i.e. the concepts, theories, as-
sumptions, generalisations, values, exemplary problems and solutions, etc. 
that provide a specific identity and constitution to research communities in the 
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sciences.16 The term is very popular in the sciences, where it often used with a 
loose and generic meaning to refer to theoretical shifts and changes, whose 
dramatic character can sometimes be overstated (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p. 
131). This loose use of the term seems close to the way in which the exposome 
is discussed as a paradigm. Namely, as we will see in the chapter, the expo-
some is in continuity with longstanding topics and approaches in epidemiol-
ogy and environmental science and has a plurality of conceptual approaches, 
which seem in contrast with the idea of a radical paradigmatic shift and the 
theoretical coherence of Kuhnian paradigms. More importantly, while the par-
adigms framework could arguably be shaped to account for elements of the 
exposome, I argue that many innovative aspects of the exposome are related to 
the technological, material and institutional dimensions of scientific research, 
that are not at the centre of the paradigms framework.  
In order to clarify what scientific innovation in the case of the exposome con-
sists in, I present the claim that the exposome has been established as a new 
repertoire, and not a paradigm. The repertoires framework has been intro-
duced by Rachel Ankeny and Sabina Leonelli as a way to understand scientific 
collaboration, community-building and change (Leonelli and Ankeny 2015). 
Ankeny and Leonelli argue that the success of a research community in estab-
lishing durable, stable and coherent change is often dependent on the develop-
ment of repertoires, which are defined as:  
The well-aligned assemblages of skills, behaviors, and material, social, and 
epistemic components that groups may use to practice certain kinds of sci-
 
16 For a detailed analysis of the notion of paradigm, including its evolution 
in Kuhn’s work after 1962, see Kuhn (1977, Chap. 12) and Hoyningen-Huene 
(1993, p. 131-162).  
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ence, and whose enactment affects the methods and results of research, in-
cluding how groups practice and manage research and train newcomers. 
(Ankeny and Leonelli 2016, p. 20) 
The constituents of a repertoire are thus of three main types: material, includ-
ing specimen, resources, data, skills and training; conceptual, including theo-
retical commitments, norms, values and goals; and social, including funding, 
institutions and infrastructures.17 In the framework, repertoires are success-
fully established when these elements are aligned, both internally and exter-
nally. Namely, this occurs when members of the community know their roles, 
possess the relevant skills, are able to perform them, operate in the context of 
beneficial funding and institutional support, and can communicate and pro-
mote their approach and outputs inside and outside their community. For ex-
ample, Ankeny and Leonelli argue that the successful discovery of the Higgs 
boson by CERN scientists was not only due to epistemic components, but also 
the alignment of their research practices with funding and institutional support 
(Ankeny and Leonelli 2016, p. 26). Repertoires do not necessarily arise as new 
approaches within a community, but are often transferred from other lines of 
research and disciplines; like franchising businesses, transfer implies the mod-
ification and adaptation of the repertoire, which retains its identifiability while 
evolving and developing from its original instantiation. For instance, Ankeny 
and Leonelli contrast the CERN success with attempts at implementing the 
same repertoire in the United States, which did not succeed because of the fail-
ure in the adaptation of crucial components like funding and governmental 
policies (Ankeny and Leonelli 2016, p. 26).  
The successful transfer, adaptation and alignment of material, conceptual and 
social components into a repertoire is thus one of the ways in which scientific 
 
17 This is not a strict classification, as elements a repertoire can often be con-
nected to more than one type: for instance, professional training of researchers 
can be considered a material as much as a social component. 
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change can manifest itself. As a consequence, in the context of repertoires, 
change does not necessarily happen in dramatic, paradigmatic ways (Ankeny 
and Leonelli, forthcoming). Moreover, several repertories may exist simultane-
ously within a single discipline or community. Ankeny and Leonelli use the 
framework to put the emphasis on the role of social, institutional, material, 
technological, organisational and economic elements in the successful estab-
lishment of communities, moving away from a privileged focus on theoretical 
and propositional knowledge. In this chapter, I use the repertoires framework 
to account for the various components and innovative elements of the expo-
some. I argue that the exposome does not hinge on conceptual components 
only – instead, the exposome should be analysed as an assemblage of aligned 
material, social and epistemic components, which constitute the exposome rep-
ertoire. 
By arguing that the exposome is a repertoire, I am arguing that the exposome 
has emerged in the context of contemporary epidemiology (also) thanks to the 
crucial role played by non-conceptual components at the material and social 
level. Namely, the exposome is built on a conceptual commitment to the un-
derstanding of exposure as a dynamic, multifaceted and global issue and the 
study of the totality of exposures. Focusing on the conceptual implications of 
the exposome is important: for instance, as I analyse in Sect. 2.4, the exposome 
implies an expansion of the concept of exposure and a broad characterisation 
of environment. Yet, an analysis of the conceptual level should not overlook 
the role of performative components, which influence and enable conceptual 
commitments, and can be innovative elements per se, independently or in re-
lation with the conceptual level. For the exposome to be a successful line of 
research, the social, material and conceptual components of the repertoire have 
to be intertwined and aligned. 
At the material level, the repertoire is based on the employment of omic tech-
nologies and the biomarkers approach. Omic techniques are used to quantify 
and study molecules at the level of: intermediary functioning of metabolism 
(metabolomics), protein or DNA adducts (adductomics), epigenetic changes 
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(epigenomics), mRNA (transcriptomics) and proteins (proteomics). Bi-
omarkers are elements that can be precisely measured and used as indicators 
or traces of various processes within an organism. The use of these techniques 
has significant influences on material specimen and data. Data sources used in 
exposome research include: cohort studies, collecting data on populations of 
interest over a long period of time with questionnaires, retrieval of physical 
samples (e.g. blood, cord blood, urine), and follow-up; secondary analysis of 
primary evidence, primarily omics techniques; experimental studies measur-
ing exposure and responses to exposure at an individual level, through wear-
able and tracking devices; and environmental studies, producing data on air 
and water pollution through monitoring stations, geo-spatial models and indi-
vidual estimates. The diversity of sources of data, which span from population 
level cohort data to micro-level data about the internal component of the expo-
some and specific features of an individual’s environment, has significant in-
fluences at the methodological level, as researchers use various epistemic strat-
egies to handle complexity (see Chapter 3). In turn, these features of material 
specimen and data influences the skillset of researchers, which is increasingly 
interdisciplinary and includes: wet lab molecular biology, for the use and anal-
ysis of omics techniques and data; statistics, for the development of regression 
models, analysis of associations and data handling; project and consortium 
management for internal communication, funding application, scheduling, 
etc.; information science for data curation and integration. The resulting assem-
blage of skills in a way further blurs the disciplinary boundaries of epidemiol-
ogy, which in itself has arguably always escaped strict disciplinary defini-
tions.18 Moreover, it reinforces interpretations of the current landscape of life 
sciences as profoundly interdisciplinary, especially in connection with an in-
creasingly data-rich context (Richardson and Stevens 2015, pp. 236-237). At the 
same time, the material, methodological and disciplinary composition of the 
 
18 See Alfredo Morabia’s presentation of epidemiology as a “theory” that is 
based on “principles” (Morabia 2005, p. 5). 
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exposome repertoire has a consequence on key conceptual components of the 
repertoire. It pushes for molecular and biological conceptualisations of what 
counts as a disease state, which is significant in the context of epidemiological 
research that has traditionally looked at the issue of disease as a statistical and 
macroscopic matter (Broadbent 2013). 
At a social level, the exposome repertoire is organised in short term research 
projects and consortia with framing and funding for public health, disease risk 
and environmental health (see the conceptual, material and social elements of 
the repertoire in Table 1). Institutionally, the organisations that have been more 
responsive to the exposome repertoire are large funding agencies and schemes 
focused on public health and the environment. Funding for the exposome has 
been directed to different – but often interrelated – research projects, including 
cohort studies collecting data that can then be used to study specific aspects 
and components of the exposome and projects aiming at analysing and inte-
grating data with other datasets. While in the US there has been a significant 
trend in establishing research centres about the exposome, which focus exten-
sively on training and education, in Europe the exposome repertoire has been 
particularly successful at securing short-term funding from the European 
Commission. The exposome has a dedicated track in Horizon 2020, the next 
funding programme of the EU Commission, where the approach is defined as 
a “toolbox for assessing and addressing the impact of environment on health” 
(see European Commission 2019). The funding context plays an important role 
in the repertoire because it influences the way in which the exposome is con-
ceptualised and framed as a way of addressing the challenge to improve health 
and reducing the burden of disease. At the same time, the social components 
of the repertoire have an influence on the ways in which the exposome is im-
plemented. For example, the short lifespan of exposome projects is a challenge 
to how much can be achieved in the repertoire. In a project like EXPOsOMICS, 
that run for five years, one of the challenges had to do with data analysis: for 
all the data that was collected in the project, five years were not enough for 
analysis and so much data had to be left for future research. 
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Type of Ingredient Elements of the repertoire 
Conceptual Adoption and use of the exposome notion 
Expansion of notion of ‘exposure’ 
Broad characterisation of ‘environment’ 
 
Methodological Omic technologies  
Biomarkers and intermediate biomarkers 
Interdisciplinary teams (molecular biology, data cura-
tion, epidemiology, medicine, statistics, management) 
 
Financial and in-
stitutional 
Short term research projects  
Long term cohort studies 
Consortia and research centres 
Funding priorities and policy mandates: public health; 
disease risk; environmental health 
Table 1. Elements of the exposome repertoire 
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2.3 The Lineage of the Exposome as an 
Emerging Repertoire 
In the previous section, I have argued that the exposome is the result of the 
alignment of conceptual, material and social components. I now use the reper-
toires framework to analyse the conditions in which the exposome has been 
conceived, developed and established and connect the components of the 
exposome as a repertoire to other repertoires and traditions in epidemiology 
and beyond (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. The sequencing repertoire, exposure science and biomarkers research merged in the exposome 
repertoire. 
 Chapter 2 
 49 
When Wild first introduced the exposome, he situated the concept in the con-
text of several debates in the life and health sciences (Wild 2005). With the in-
troduction of the exposome, Wild hoped that the concept could help shift at-
tention to the “need for methodologic developments in exposure assessment” 
and for “methods with the same precision for an individual’s environmental 
exposure as we have for the individual’s genome” (Wild 2005, p. 1848). Wild 
praised the development made in genomics, but also noted that the low pene-
trance of genetic variants – as opposed to their high prevalence – implies that 
their contribution to disease burden is crucially linked to the presence of some 
environmental exposure and therefore argued for a broader consideration of 
and a focus on the environmental side. At the same time, Wild also noted that 
many disease-exposure interactions were ill-defined and interactions with the 
genome had not yet been discussed in depth. In Wild’s intentions, the expo-
some was to bring propositions together for epidemiology in a similar way to 
what the genome had done for genetic research. Namely, 2005 was just a few 
years after the end of the Human Genome Project. The Human Genome Pro-
ject, which officially began in 1990, with the goal of sequencing the complete 
human genome, is a fascinating case of contemporary science, where economic, 
political, epistemic, societal elements are intertwined and which was a major 
breakthrough for the life sciences, with significant impact on funding, concep-
tualisation of genes and genetics, science management, concept of disease, 
technology, data infrastructures, etc. (Guttinger and Dupré 2016; Gannett 2016; 
Hilgartner 2017). I argue that the exposome draws significantly on the sequenc-
ing repertoire that emerged in the context of genomic projects and has since then 
increasingly spread in the life and health sciences.  
From a technical and material perspective, the sequencing repertoire is based 
on sequencing and mapping techniques, which are used to individuate the se-
quences that make up the genetic material and thus understand the molecular 
composition, functions and inter-relations of genomes (Hilgartner 2017, Chap. 
1). In the context of the Human Genome Project, these techniques were devel-
oped with the aim of increasing the resolution of genetic maps and their speed 
of production. The use of sequencing techniques and their high-throughput 
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character increased the importance and role of sequence databases (Leonelli 
2010b). Together with large data infrastructures, the sequencing repertoire in-
cludes specific norms and values around data sharing (Maxson Jones et al. 
2018). Beyond the Human Genome Project, the sequencing repertoire has been 
successful at securing large funding in connection with the need for sustained 
development of infrastructures and technologies, as well as the rhetorical fram-
ing of the benefits for biomedical research. Sequencing repertoire projects ben-
efit from large, blue-skies, medium or long-term governmental funding, espe-
cially in the US and Europe. From a conceptual perspective, the sequencing 
repertoire is centred around the role of the genome as the “epistemic thing” 
connecting various approaches (Rheinberger and Müller-Wille 2017, pp. 5-6). 
As a result of the complex combination of these ingredients, the size and struc-
ture of many sequencing projects, the repertoire gathers interdisciplinary 
teams of researchers with a background in the life sciences as well as infor-
mation science, statistics, physics, etc.  
The exposome shares and relies on various elements of the sequencing reper-
toire. Conceptually, the exposome lies in a two-fold relation with the genome. 
On the one hand, the various epistemic breakthroughs of genome-sequencing 
are constantly mentioned in discussions on the exposome and the wording it-
self indicates a close relation to the genome.19 On the other hand, the idea of 
the exposome as the necessary complement of the genome puts it into a critical 
position to the genome and points to the need for new and different ap-
proaches, beyond genomics. This is evident in Wild’s considerations about the 
low penetrance of genetic variants and their contribution to disease risks, 
which calls for a more significant consideration of the role of the environment 
(Wild 2005). In an article that played a crucial role for the exposome, Stephen 
 
19 The term can be seen in conjunction with the use of -omes and -omics as 
suffixes in the life sciences, which has significantly increased in the last decade 
(Guttinger and Dupré 2016).  
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Rappaport and Martyn T. Smith connected the idea of an exposome as a new 
“paradigm” for research on disease risks to the need to put emphasis on the 
role of environmental exposure, in contrast to gene-centrism (Rappaport and 
Smith 2010). Rappaport and Smith noted how, while 70-80% of disease risks 
are due to changes in the environment, instead of genetic variations, the latter 
have nonetheless received more attention than the former. Whilst also retain-
ing a critical perspective on genomic approaches, the hope is that the exposome 
can do for environmental epidemiology what the genome did for genomics, i.e. 
to collect and organise under an umbrella concept various ideas and ap-
proaches to the study of the relation between environmental exposure and dis-
ease.20 
The close relation between the exposome and the sequencing repertoire is also 
shown by the transfer and use of other ingredients of this repertoire. From a 
material and technical point of view, the exposome draws on the advancement 
of omics techniques that can be traced back to sequencing and mapping tech-
nologies. Techniques that are referred to as omics expand on traditional the 
sequencing toolkit by applying a high-throughput approach to the analysis, 
quantification and characterisation of biological molecules in the cell and its 
environment. The exposome repertoire is to a large extent about bringing the 
developments in omics techniques from genomics to epidemiological research, 
as a way of trying to get a similar level of precision in measuring the presence, 
variation and impact of exposures (Rappaport 2011). Through omics, the expo-
some repertoire also draws on many infrastructures for the handling and or-
 
20 The article by Rapport and Smith (2010) was published in the “Insights” 
section of Science and arguably served as a re-introduction of the exposome to 
a larger audience (see also Siroux and colleagues on the increase in number of 
citations of exposome in PubMed after 2010, Siroux et al. 2016). 
 The Exposome as a Postgenomic Repertoire: Exploring Scientific Change in Contemporary 
Epidemiology 
 52 
ganisation of data from the sequencing repertoire. For instance, exposome pro-
jects such as EXPOsOMICS use bioinformatics providers often used in the ge-
nomic setting, like Genedata (https://www.genedata.com).  
Another feature shared between the sequencing repertoire and the exposome 
is the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of research, in particular in relation 
to the use of large and diverse datasets. In this interdisciplinary context, a sec-
ond area of research that I argue played a significant role in the development 
and establishment of the exposome repertoire is exposure science. Exposure sci-
ence is an interdisciplinary area of research that “addresses the intensity and 
duration of contact of humans or other organisms with those agents (defined 
as chemical, physical, or biologic stressors) and their fate in living systems” 
(US National Research Council 2012, p. 3). While its roots are connected to early 
work in industrial and occupational hygiene, exposure science can be consid-
ered a relatively new field of research, whose definition and specification took 
place in the US context around the time of Wild’s initial proposal of the expo-
some (Lioy 2010; van Tongeren and Cherrie 2012). I have mentioned earlier the 
role played by an article published in Science in spreading the exposome to a 
larger audience (Rappaport and Smith 2010). Both authors come from an expo-
sure science background. Rappaport is currently one of the major proponents 
of the exposome in the US and directs the Berkeley Center for Exposure Biol-
ogy.  
Until the 1920s exposure scientists and environmental epidemiologists collab-
orated on the study of workplace exposures in the context of occupational dis-
ease. This changed with the establishment of two different agencies in the US 
in the 1970s (on exposures in the workplace and in the ambient environment), 
which created two distinct paths of research in the field (Lioy and Rappaport 
2011). At the same time, the focus shifted from human health towards risk as-
sessment and compliance with standards, from measurement of personal and 
individual exposure to predictions of exposure levels and presence of chemi-
cals and toxicants from deterministic models (Rappaport 2001). Exposure sci-
ence is now centred on the focus of the “fundamental issues of whether and 
how human contact with toxicants occurs after release into the environment or 
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workplace” (Lioy 2010, p. 1081). Around the same period, environmental epi-
demiologists started to focus on the links between genetic and environmental 
factors and the genetic determinants of disease.  
Exposure science was very important for the exposome repertoire from a meth-
odological and material point of view, especially for the focus on internal 
chemical environment as one of the most “relevant” foci of analysis and the 
use of chemical tools such as mass spectrometry (Rappaport 2001). The expo-
some repertoire also transferred from exposure science some funding schemes, 
especially in the US, where exposome projects are funded by the same govern-
mental and national-level agencies that fund exposure science projects. Addi-
tionally, the inclusion of some of the rhetorical tools of exposure science also 
allows to pitch the exposome in terms of occupational and public health issues 
(Juarez et al. 2014). In turn, the exposome has also been important for exposure 
science, where it is considered a major shift from the focus on genetic to envi-
ronmental factors (Lioy and Rappaport 2011).  
The benefits of the exposome approach are increasingly discussed for health 
and biomedical issues, for instance in the context of nutrition science and per-
sonalised medicine (Prescott and Logan 2017; Verma et al. 2018), air pollution 
research (Vineis 2018), the nature-nurture debate (Miller and Jones 2014) and 
pregnancy research (Robinson and Vrijheid 2015). Wild himself has introduced 
the concept to different lines of biomedical research, including cancer research 
(Wild 2009, 2011, 2012).21 In this context, I argue that biomarkers research played 
a crucial role in the shaping of the exposome repertoire. 
Biomarkers are used as indicators of normal and pathogenic processes and re-
sponses to stimuli within an organism (Strimbu and Tavel 2010; see also Russo 
 
21 Since 2009, Wild has been director of the IARC, the International Agency 
for Research on Cancer, an intergovernmental agency that works under the 
World Health Organization of the United Nations.  
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2017, pp. 153-154). In a broad sense, any medical sign is a biomarker, including 
measurements such as pulse, blood pressure and more or less sophisticated 
blood tests; thus, biomarkers can be any indication of any medical state. The 
use of biomarkers has had a steady increase since the 1980s, especially in the 
context of clinical trials, as surrogate outcomes of diseases including cancer 
and heart disease, basic and clinical drug research (Strimbu and Travel 2010, 
p. 466). In this sense, the development of molecular techniques and their appli-
cation and use in the context of biomedical research has played a crucial role, 
specifying the notion of biomarkers in a research context and pushing the level 
of abstraction to a molecular level (Boniolo and Nathan 2017). Unsurprisingly, 
the use of molecular biomarkers for epidemiological purposes has been estab-
lished in the context of molecular epidemiology, with the development and 
incorporation of laboratory techniques to study the molecular basis of disease 
(Bonassi and Au 2002).22 
Biomarkers research has provided many ingredients of the exposome reper-
toire. From a methodological perspective, biomarkers are explicitly mentioned 
as crucial elements in introductions of the exposome as a new paradigm for 
epidemiology. Together with omics, the use and development of biomarkers 
research is supposed to give more precision to the techniques of the exposome 
repertoire. The connection between biomarkers and the exposome is often dis-
cussed as a way of improving precisions in the context of environmental expo-
sure, in order to try and adjust the differences in precision between genetic and 
environmental measurements (Wild 2005, p. 1848; Wild 2009). The extent to 
which biomarkers are influential on the methodological ingredients of the 
 
22 Wild himself was chair of the Molecular Epidemiology Unit of the Uni-
versity of Leeds when he published the first article on the exposome. He has 
a background in pharmacology, oncology and environmental and molecular 
epidemiology, where he has mostly done research on the interplay between 
environmental and genetic risk factors in cancer causation.  
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exposome repertoire is such that, practically, in exposome projects most of the 
work consists in the search for biomarkers of external and internal exposure 
and biomarkers of disease and in the study and analysis of their associations. 
This has several interesting consequences for the exposome repertoire. First, 
the study of biomarkers is connected to the use of molecular tools for the study 
of both the external and internal component of the exposome, with the afore-
mentioned aim of bridging the gap between the accuracy and precision of 
measurements of external and internal exposures (Turner et al. 2017). In addi-
tion, the molecular components of biomarkers research mark another differ-
ence with more traditionally genomic and sequencing methods, such as 
GWAS, as these are considered to enable more direct analyses of what lies in 
between associations and shed light on molecular pathways and mechanisms 
(Russo and Vineis 2016). Thus, the connections between biomarkers research 
and the exposome repertoire extend beyond methodological aspects, and, at 
the conceptual level, inform etiological approaches used in the exposome rep-
ertoire and push for molecular conceptualisations of health and disease 
(Chadeau-Hyam et al. 2011). 
2.4 Tracing Scientific Innovation in Reper-
toires: The Exposome as a Postgenomic Rep-
ertoire 
I have used the repertoires framework for my account of the material, social 
and epistemic components of the exposome and the connection of these com-
ponents to the conditions under which the exposome was conceived, devel-
oped and established. What I haven’t discussed in depth yet is scientific inno-
vation and change in the context of the exposome. Understanding scientific 
change is indeed one of the primary uses of the repertoires framework.  
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Connecting discussions on change to the context of contemporary epidemiol-
ogy and health and life science research, I argue that the exposome is a post-
genomic repertoire. The term postgenomic has been used to describe a ‘new’ era 
in the life and health sciences after the completion of the Human Genome Pro-
ject. This has led to an interdisciplinary debate where philosophers, historians, 
sociologists and scientists have discussed the extent to which postgenomic re-
search can be considered innovative (Richardson and Stevens 2015). Science 
scholars in this debate have mostly cautioned against claims depicting post-
genomics as a new paradigm and a revolution in the sciences, pointing to the 
continuity between the genomic and postgenomic era and criticising enthusi-
astic tales of scientific innovation (Gibbon et al. 2018). As a result, ‘post-
genomic’ should be used with caution, as it is a loaded term that could be in-
terpreted to describe define something as highly innovative and ‘revolution-
ary’ (Richardson 2011). By claiming that the exposome is a postgenomic reper-
toire, I use a historical meaning of the term, whereby postgenomic refers to 
research that: employs genomic and genomic-based technologies; is increas-
ingly aware of the complexity in interpreting genomic results and data; and 
has a critical engagement with gene-centric approaches (see e.g. Leonelli 2018). 
As we have seen, critiques of the extensive use of genomic data and gene-cen-
trism to explain human disease are constantly present in introductions and 
presentations of the exposome. The exposome repertoire extensively employs 
omic techniques, which are based on technological development of the ge-
nomics era. Rhetorically, the exposome is often pitched as a ‘post-genome no-
tion’, in the sense that it pushes for research that should provide solutions that 
the genome did not deliver. Yet, more specifically, I argue that postgenomic 
features of the exposome repertoire can be identified at the conceptual and 
methodological levels, because, similarly to what has been argued by science 
scholars in the postgenomic context, these are innovative but have strong con-
tinuity with longstanding lines of research and approaches. 
Consider, for example, the role played by the concept of environment in the 
exposome. The operationalisation of the environment and its role in human 
health and disease is often considered among the triggering factors for moving 
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into a postgenomic era. One of the ‘paradoxical’ results of the Human Genome 
Project was the discovery that the environment played a role, in determining 
human health and disease, that was more significant than what gene-centric 
approaches had assumed. Yet, as highlighted by Shostak and Moinester, in 
postgenomic settings the environment is conceptualised in several different 
ways, as it might refer to the cell, hormonal profiles, ambient environments, 
the body, social networks, etc. (Shostak and Moinester 2015). This is leading to 
blurring distinctions between internal and external environments or between 
social and biological environments (Landecker and Panofsky 2013; Lloyd and 
Raikhel 2018) and calls for reconceptualisations of the genome in environmen-
tal terms (Keller 2015).  
As we have seen, the push for more consideration of the role of environment 
in disease is indeed one of the reasons for the introduction of the exposome. In 
addition, in line with the broader postgenomic context, exposome researchers 
understand the environment in a variety of different ways. For example, Wild 
talks of the environment as anything that is “non-genetic” (Wild 2009); Rap-
paport identifies different ways of interpreting the role of the environment and 
therefore discusses the concept of “relevant environment” (Rappaport 2011); 
Robinson and Vrijheid discuss the body as “an environment” (Robinson and 
Vrijheid 2015). Are these considerations of the environment and plurality of 
conceptualisations postgenomic innovations of the exposome? I would argue 
that, in the epidemiological context, the pluralistic approach of the exposome 
is not a radical innovation, but rather a continuation of the various ways in 
which the environment has been conceptualised in epidemiology. Namely, in 
epidemiology, environmental features are traditionally measured indirectly 
through the collection of exposure data, as ‘environmental exposures’. This 
makes it fairly easy to operationalise much, if not anything, as environmental, 
from air and water pollution and the socio-economic status, to occupational 
settings, dietary conditions, and all the way to the internal chemical features of 
the body. The exposome repertoire merges the pluralism of postgenomic ap-
proaches with the tradition of epidemiology, thus developing a framing of the 
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environment that, rhetorically, speaks to both epidemiological and post-
genomic audiences.23  
This leads me to an account of the conceptual innovations of the exposome that 
emphasises its pluralistic approach to the environment and continuity with 
longstanding approaches. I thus come to conclusions on the conceptual inno-
vation of postgenomics that are similar to the arguments of many science schol-
ars. My analysis is an expansion of these arguments, as it focuses on the influ-
ence of postgenomics beyond fields like biology and genomics, that have usu-
ally been the focus in this context (Green 2016). The use of the repertoires 
framework can also be considered an expansion of the debate, as it emphasises 
that non-conceptual components are crucial both as enablers of scientific 
change and as ways in which scientific innovation and change can manifest 
themselves. One of the non-conceptual elements that is often discussed in post-
genomics is the availability of new and large datasets, or ‘big data’ (Ankeny 
and Leonelli 2015, pp. 128-129; Gibbon et al. 2018).  
In the exposome, the use of omics techniques and approaches from exposure 
science expands the types and size of exposure data that are collected and used, 
which range from individual exposure estimates to data about internal pres-
ence and responses to exposure. Traditionally, in epidemiology exposure data 
has been collected by sampling of environmental conditions or, indirectly, 
through interviews, surveys, questionnaires asking study participants about 
features of their surrounding environment. The shift to high-throughput omics 
is innovative because it expands exposure with the inclusion of new dimen-
sions, most importantly the internal dimension: to be exposed does not only 
mean to be exposed to external elements, but also to the internal chemical en-
vironment. In abstract terms, we can think of exposure as the property of being 
 
23 This framing also shows in the integration of various sources of data on 
the environment in terms of exposure data (Chapter 3; Leonelli and Tempini 
2018). 
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exposed to something. In the context of the health sciences and epidemiology, 
exposure has more specific connotations: it refers to a characterisation of prox-
imity and/or contact with something that might transmit disease or other out-
comes of interest, to be measured through an amount of a factor that an indi-
vidual or a population are exposed to (Lee and Pickard 2013). The availability 
of technologies providing data on the internal chemical environment leads to 
the expansion of this property, which in the exposome has both external and 
internal components, classified as generic external exposure, specific external 
exposure and internal exposure. It is the shift from the traditional externalist 
focus to the inclusion of the internal level of the exposome which is considered 
an innovation by epidemiologists and leads them to discuss the exposome as 
the totality of exposures, a global approach to exposure and a holistic way of 
studying the individual (Vrijheid 2014; Robinson and Vrijheid 2015; Stingone 
et al. 2017).  
Shifts at the material and technological level are thus significant scientific in-
novations of the exposome, as well as postgenomics more generally.24 At the 
same time, arguing that the exposome is a postgenomic repertoire points to the 
alignment of material, technological and conceptual components. This is par-
ticularly significant when discussing the epistemic implications of large da-
tasets. Science scholars have criticised many claims about revolutionary 
changes due to the use of large, new types of datasets in the sciences (Leonelli 
2014; Leonelli 2016a). Similarly, as part of this debate, my use of the repertoires 
framework points to the alignment of data with other ingredients of the reper-
toire: the availability of new types of data can lead to the revision and expan-
sion of conceptual aspects of the exposome repertoire, but scientific innovation 
is the result of the alignment of various components. Data can thus hardly be 
 
24 See also Gross and colleagues’ analysis of the emergence, in contempo-
rary biology, of new approaches and fields in relation to the development of 
high-throughput data technologies (Gross et al. 2019).  
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a difference maker on its own, as its role of data is connected to other elements 
of the repertoires, such as conceptual commitments, infrastructures, funding 
and skills.25  
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter set out to analyse the exposome, as a new concept that has recently 
been introduced in epidemiology, and to understand its innovative character. 
I have used the conceptual framework of repertoires to distinguish the mate-
rial, social and conceptual components that constitute the exposome as a spe-
cific line of research, approach and community of researchers. This distinction 
has enabled me to connect some of these components to other traditions and 
disciplinary contexts of research in the life and health sciences. In this way, I 
have developed an account of the innovation of the exposome that is closely 
connected to the conditions in which it was developed, introduced and estab-
lished, and thus problematises views of the exposome as a new paradigm for 
research in epidemiology. As a result of my analysis, I hope to have expanded 
and contributed to the repertoires framework, by showing a case in which a 
repertoire is the complex assemblage of various other repertoires and tradi-
tions, in addition to cases of transfers of one repertoire in another context. In 
 
25 My point here is close to critiques of technological determinism, i.e. the 
view that the emergence of new technologies can be the sole determinant of 
social changes (broadly construed). I would argue that technological deter-
minism is often an implicit component of claims about the revolutionary 
changes that data-intensive methods can have on scientific epistemology (see 
e.g. Hey et al. 2009). Technological determinism has been extensively dis-
cussed in the science and technology studies literature (see e.g. Sismondo 
2010, pp. 96-105). 
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addition, the exposome helps to illustrate another key characteristic of reper-
toires: no one component of the repertoire is central, primary or fundamental. 
I would emphasise that this is one of the most interesting and possibly innova-
tive aspects of the framework, which can be considered a synthesis of various 
traditional views on the primacy of theoretical components in philosophy of 
science and social components in science studies. Keeping all these compo-
nents together in analyses of scientific research yields situated and local ac-
counts of scientific practice (Leonelli 2016a, p. 190), which aim at looking at the 
very local details of research as part of the critical assessment of what consti-
tutes change, innovation and success in contemporary science.  
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Chapter 3 
Making Evidential Claims in Epidemiol-
ogy: Three Strategies for the Study of the 
Exposome 
 
Abstract: In this chapter, I present an account of contemporary epidemiology 
based on the notion of evidential claims and show how this helps specify and 
differentiate data practices, methods, approaches and results. Analysing cur-
rent research on the exposome, I identify three different strategies to generate 
evidential claims. The macro strategy, which identifies the initial evidence plat-
form and generates scoping claims that restrict samples and provide an initial 
understanding of phenomena. The micro strategy, which collects data of sig-
nificantly different types to generate evidential claims on structures at the mi-
croscopic level. The association strategy, which uses evidence from the two 
other strategies to generate evidential claims at the statistical level of associa-
tions between exposure to the environment and outcomes of interest. Differen-
tiating between these strategies enables to identify and unpack the epistemic 
commitments involved at various steps of research; gives a characterisation of 
the context of data collection, interpretation and use; and provides a different 
philosophical perspective on epidemiology and epidemiological evidence.  
3.1 Introduction 
The health sciences have a long tradition of studying the ways in which the 
environment has an influence on human health. Epidemiology is the area of 
clinical medicine that comprises the various approaches to the study of these 
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phenomena by focusing on the relation between outcomes of interest and the 
exposure to the environment, broadly construed to include diet, external chem-
icals, lifestyle, etc.26 More precisely, epidemiology can be defined as the study 
of the distribution and variation of exposure and disease in populations (Russo 
and Vineis 2017, p. 252).  
Relatively little philosophical attention has been dedicated to epidemiology 
and most of the focus has been in the context of discussions on causality and 
causal inference. Some philosophers have studied ways of thinking about the 
aetiology of disease in epidemiology by analysing the historical development 
of causal models of disease (Broadbent 2009, 2013, 2014; Fuller 2018). Others 
have looked at the use of causal and non-causal terms by epidemiologists 
(DeVreese 2009; Russo 2009), which has led to discussions on causal explana-
tions in epidemiology (Campaner 2011) and the interpretation of epidemiolog-
ical results in causal terms (Broadbent 2013, pp. 26–55). Epidemiology has also 
been used as a case study for philosophical accounts of causal inference, such 
as the Russo-Williamson Thesis (see Chapter 4). 
In this chapter, building on recent philosophical scholarship on data practices 
in the life sciences (Leonelli 2016a) and on evidential claims and evidential rea-
soning in the historical sciences (Chapman and Wylie 2016), I look more closely 
at data practices employed by epidemiologists and I present a typology of their 
methods, approaches and results based on the notion of evidential claims. I 
start by explaining my use of the notion of evidential claim in Section 3.2. Then, 
in Section 3.3, I analyse data practices in contemporary epidemiological re-
search from the standpoint of evidential claims. This allows me to show the 
multiple layers that characterise research, where significantly different ap-
proaches, lines of work and types of claims can be distinguished. I argue that 
these differences can be seen in terms of distinct strategies for evidential claims. 
 
26 Here I am following Thompson and Upshur’s distinction between clini-
cal medicine and bench medicine (Thompson and Upshur 2018, pp. 2-4; p. 24).  
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I identify three strategies. The macro strategy, which generates scoping claims 
that restrict the sample and provides an initial understanding of the phenom-
ena under study. The micro strategy, which is applied to collect different types 
of data and generate evidential claims on microscopic structures. The associa-
tion strategy, that uses evidence from the two former strategies to generate evi-
dential claims at the statistical level of associations between exposure to the 
environment and outcomes of interest. As I hope to show, this typology yields 
a new perspective on the epistemology of epidemiological research and current 
philosophical discussions on the relation between data, evidence and 
knowledge (Sect. 3.4).  
As a case study in current environmental epidemiology, I focus on the line of 
research known as the exposome. I base my philosophical analysis on data and 
experiences I gathered through qualitative interviews, participatory observa-
tion and discussions with epidemiologists in EXPOsOMICS, one of the leading 
projects on the exposome. Focusing on this line of research is important for a 
number of reasons. First, it enables to look at an area of epidemiological inquiry 
that is young and in a particularly interesting state, as central notions are still 
under discussion (Stingone et al. 2017), technology is new and sometimes used 
for the first time in this context (Turner et al. 2017) and there is talk of the expo-
some as a new “paradigm” (Vrijheid 2014). The exposome is defined as the 
totality of exposures individuals face during their lifetime, which includes ex-
ternal and internal aspects of exposure.27 The notion can be considered a syn-
thesis of the traditional focus on the external element of exposure and the in-
novative use of molecular, ‘omic’ technologies for the study of internal aspects. 
This also puts the exposome approach at centre of medical innovations dis-
cussed by philosophers of science, such as the molecularisation of medicine, 
 
27 As we have seen in Chapter 2, the notion was first conceived and intro-
duced by Wild (2005), and then further developed by Rappaport and Smith 
(2010) and Wild (2012). 
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data-intensive methods and genomics and post-genomics (Boniolo and Nathan 
2017; Gibbon et al. 2018). In addition, this is a line of research which is signifi-
cantly funded, especially in Europe and the United States, in connection to the 
potential benefit on public health issues (Juarez et al. 2014).28 Researchers look 
for associations between environmental pollutants and disease with the aim of 
identifying intermediate elements or features that are associated both retro-
spectively and prospectively, that is both with the exposure and with the dis-
ease. These are referred to as intermediate biomarkers, which are considered 
crucial to the understanding of the pathways through which the environment 
influences disease, thus potentially allowing for the identification of disease-
related reactions at an early stage. Assessing exposures helps determining lev-
els of risks associated with the presence of specific elements in the environment 
and, consequently, results are used to inform policy-making regarding the ac-
cepted standards. Focusing on exposome research therefore makes it possible 
to study an area of epidemiology that works at the interface of environment 
and health issues, with integrated approaches and interdisciplinary teams.29  
3.2 Focusing on Evidential Claims 
Before going into the details of exposome research, let me briefly specify the 
central notions that I use in the chapter. In my analysis, I rely on the notion of 
 
28 At the end of 2012, EXPOsOMICS was funded by the European Commis-
sion, as part of the seventh framework for the European Union's Research and 
Innovation programme. 
29 EXPOsOMICS was structured as a consortium of 13 research centres in 
Europe and the US, coordinated by the Department of Epidemiology and Bi-
ostatistics of Imperial College London and working in collaboration with 
other research teams in Europe and the US. 
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evidential claims to interpret data practices in exposome research. I view evi-
dential claims as claims that identify the datasets that are to be used as evidence 
for the investigation of phenomena. I highlight that different types of eviden-
tial claims are generated at different stages of exposome research and through 
different approaches, methods and lines of work. I claim that various aspects 
of exposome research can be interpreted as relying on or building towards ev-
idential claims, beyond explicit claims made by researchers.  
For the notion of evidential claims, I draw inspiration from philosophical in-
quiries on archaeology. In the work of Alison Wylie, evidential claims are dis-
cussed as the main results of archaeological results. In Wylie’s account, eviden-
tial claims are relations relying on “mediating assumptions that establish a link 
between the material traces that survive archaeologically and the past events 
or conditions of life that are presumed responsible (in part) for producing these 
traces” (Wylie 2000, pp. 231-232). The relation is established through a chain of 
inferences, warrants, postulates and interpretations that provide the necessary 
“scaffolding” to determine how and if material traces can be used as evidence 
(Wylie 2017).30 A simple example of the evidential claims discussed in this con-
text may be of the kind “archaeological observation of ceramics is evidence that 
 
30 The notion of scaffolding has been developed in the context of discus-
sions on cultural evolution by William Wimsatt and James Griesemer (2007). 
Scaffolding is the result of “structure-like dynamical interactions with per-
forming individuals that are means through which other structures or com-
petencies are constructed or acquired by individuals or organizations” (Wim-
satt 2013 p. 568). In recent years, the notion has been used by many philoso-
phers of science to refer to elements of scientific practice that enable and can-
alise research.  
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the site under investigation was occupied for 10-15 years”.31 Differently from 
Wylie, I take the “factual ground” of the evidential claims I discuss in the chap-
ter to be datasets and not necessarily only material traces. In other words, the 
evidential claims I analyse here are of the kind “data collected through this 
procedure is evidence for the relation between air pollution and cardiovascular 
disease”. In this way, the epistemic role of an evidential claim consists in the 
identification of a dataset (“data collected through this procedure”) and the 
specification of its evidential value (“is evidence for”) in the context of the in-
vestigation of a phenomenon (“relation between air pollution and cardiovas-
cular disease”). This is important to stress, because Chapman and Wylie some-
times use the word ‘data’ to describe the factual ground of evidential claims, 
but data is sometimes also used as a synonym to ‘evidence’, which – as also 
suggested by Leonelli (2017) – may lead to some confusion. For the notion of 
data, I follow Sabina Leonelli’s account, according to which data is any mate-
rial artefact that can be used as evidence for claims on phenomena and can be 
circulated among individuals (Leonelli 2016a, pp. 69-92). When I discuss data 
as the factual ground of evidential claims, the term is thus to be understood as 
encompassing data generated digitally, material traces and physical samples. 
The use of data as a unit of philosophical analysis has been developed in recent 
years in the context of a multidisciplinary and critical debate, in part originated 
as a response to the rhetoric surrounding ‘big data’, to which philosophy of 
 
31 This is an adapted and simplified version of one of the evidential claims 
that Chapman and Wylie analyse (Chapman and Wylie 2016, p. 153). Here, I 
am mostly interested in highlighting the general features that constitute evi-
dential claims in their account, which is why I am not delving into the specif-
ics of their reconstruction.  
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science is increasingly contributing.32 Epidemiology is particularly interesting 
from a data perspective because it has traditionally been concerned with the 
collection, storing and analysis of (big) data, but the availability of new sources 
of data and new analytic tools are often presented as a significant novelty, es-
pecially in the context of issues at the interface of environment and health (Le-
onelli and Tempini 2018).  
3.3 Three Strategies for Evidential Claims 
I now turn to present a typology, based on the notion of evidential claims, of 
the ways in which epidemiologists acquire knowledge on the exposome. I in-
terpret data practices in exposome research as building various evidential 
claims that identify datasets as evidence for the study of phenomena or the 
development of subsequent, higher-level claims. The evidential claims I iden-
tify are not necessarily explicit, but still play a crucial role in the study of the 
exposome. The framework of evidential claims allows me to identify the use of 
three strategies for evidential claims (the macro, the micro and the association 
strategies), which differ in terms of distinct approaches to the phenomena un-
der study, distinct kinds of work that researchers carry out and distinct types 
of evidential claims (see Table 2). My empirical reconstruction is based on dis-
cussions with researchers in EXPOsOMICS on what they called the “data 
workflow” of the project, which is used as an organising principle for the dif-
ferent sources and journeys of data and related activities. I expand on this pri-
mary classification of the data practices of EXPOsOMICS, with the aim of 
showing that various aspects of the project can be interpreted as aimed at the 
 
32 See Chapter 1 and, for instance, the special issues of Big Data & Society 
edited by Iliadis and Russo (2016), Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological 
and Biomedical Sciences edited by Leonelli (2012) and Science, Technology, & Hu-
man Values edited by Leonelli, Rappert and Davies (Leonelli et al. 2017). 
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generation of evidential claims. I view these strategies as ways of mobilising 
datasets on the basis of which evidential claims are generated. Thus, the strat-
egies are about data collection as much as about retrieving data from other re-
positories or building diverse and integrated datasets.33 
 Approach  Lines of work Type of evidential claim 
Macro  
strategy 
Population 
level  
- Selection of 
cohort studies 
- Retrieval from 
cohort studies 
Evidential claims about 
scopes of investigation 
Micro 
strategy 
Microscopic 
level 
- Omics 
- GIS  
- Experimental 
studies 
Evidential claims on mi-
croscopic structures 
Association 
strategy 
Association 
level 
- Regression 
models 
Evidential claims about 
statistical associations 
Table 2. The macro, micro and association strategies along three dimensions 
In the next subsections, I delve into the details of each of the three strategies 
and I illustrate the strategies using examples from research, in EXPOsOMICS, 
on the relation between health and exposure to environmental pollutants. In 
order to show how these strategies are interrelated in the context of research 
 
33 The integration of a variety of sources of data in EXPOsOMICS was in 
itself one of the goals of the project, and is usually connected to its innovative 
character (Vineis et al. 2017a, p. 2; Fleming et al. 2017, p. 12). 
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published as a result of EXPOsOMICS, I refer to the work of Fiorito and col-
leagues on the relation between air pollution and cardio- and cerebrovascular 
disease as an example (Fiorito et al. 2018). I call ‘macro strategy’ the strategy 
that is implemented at the starting point of research, as part of the selection 
and retrieval of samples from cohort studies, and individuates the dataset that 
serves as the primary evidential platform for individual studies. This is where 
we can see some of the traditional tools of epidemiology at work, most promi-
nently cohort studies. What I call ‘micro strategy’ is on the other hand the strat-
egy that comprises the novel approaches employed in exposome research, such 
as omic techniques and geographical information systems. This strategy works 
on data specified by the macro strategy and is used to perform a microscopic 
analysis of the structures of data, which generates high resolution data on the 
internal component of exposure and the surrounding environment. I call ‘as-
sociation strategy’ the strategy that is at work to statistically analyse data gen-
erated through the micro strategy, in order to identify associations between 
elements and features of the environment and health outcomes of interest.  
3.3.1 The Macro Strategy: Primary Data Retrieval 
from Cohort Studies 
The first strategy for evidential claims works at the macroscopic level of inves-
tigation. It is based on data collected in observational, cohort studies, that fol-
low a population of interest for an extended period of time. Cohort studies 
track variables including clinical states, outcomes of interest, features of par-
ticipants' lifestyle and their surrounding environment (city’s district, house, 
work, family, etc.). Data collection is based both on the extraction of physical 
samples (e.g. blood, cord blood, maternal milk, hair, etc.) and the use of ques-
tionnaires and one-to-one interviews. Most of the data of cohort studies is col-
lected in hospitals, by physicians, nurses or trained interviewers. The goal is to 
bio-monitor or follow participants throughout their life, so as to track the po-
tential development of outcomes of interests. This is usually achieved through 
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what is known as follow-up, whereby participants are tracked at different 
points of their life, as they may for instance be asked to answer a new ques-
tionnaire years after the initial recruitment or data may be retrieved through 
record linkage with hospital, mortality and local health authority registries.  
Several cohort studies are currently in operation and widely used as sources of 
evidence in epidemiology. Generally, they tend to differ in terms of: areas cov-
ered, as some are national whilst others are transnational and/or continental; 
focus of research, as some are interested in tracking a variety of disease states 
and influential factors, whilst others are more specifically focused on only a 
handful of phenomena; and time, as some are set up to run constantly and 
without a predetermined end point, while others come to an end at a specific 
time but still provide data that can be further analysed and re-used. For in-
stance, one of the larger studies used in EXPOsOMICS was EPIC (the European 
Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition), which followed 521,000 
participants across 10 European countries for almost 15 year starting in the 
1990s, with a broad focus looking at the relationships between diet, nutritional 
status, lifestyle and environmental factors, and the incidence of cancer and 
other chronic diseases. An example of a smaller cohort is INMA (INfancia y 
Medio Ambiente), which is a currently operating study that focuses on the na-
tional level and looks at the exposome during pregnancy, as to investigate the 
relations between environmental exposures and child development.  
A significant portion of epidemiological inquiry is primarily concerned with 
the establishment and management of cohort studies. However, these data col-
lection activities usually precede projects like EXPOsOMICS, where research-
ers selected and withdrew datasets from specific cohorts, as opposed to setting 
up their own cohorts. They will want to focus on a specific outcome of interest 
(such as cardio-vascular disease, child development, increase in oxidative 
stress) and, consequently, they will ask for a subset of the data that is collected 
in the chosen cohort study. Researchers in charge will thus create a dataset 
meeting the requests and will upload it to the data infrastructure which is used 
in EXPOsOMICS.  
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The strategy that I want to describe here is thus not about setting up cohort 
studies, but rather about generating the initial evidential space. Through this 
strategy, researchers develop evidential claims that are essentially scoping 
claims at the macro level and concern trends in the populations under study 
and the surrounding environment. In other words, they have the epistemic 
goal of identifying and describing the initial dataset and do not provide a pre-
cise analysis of the links between trends in populations and trends in environ-
mental pollutants. Rather, they are established to identify which kind of data 
is to be used for further research. The macro strategy thus employs a popula-
tion-level approach to the phenomena under study, involves the work of se-
lecting and receiving data and is used to make evidential claims that specify 
the scope and space in which research is to be developed and shaped. These 
results require the work of different kinds of individuals and groups, includ-
ing: health professionals in hospitals, epidemiologists setting up and coordi-
nating the cohort, and, in EXPOsOMICS, epidemiologists who selected and re-
ceived the data and perform an initial analysis, statisticians, and project man-
agers.34  
The main results of this strategy are usually framed in exposome research as 
either “health data” or “covariates”. The first category includes the physical 
samples as well as other pieces of information, collected via questionnaire or 
interviews, that concerns health states of participants. The latter category co-
vers what is considered additional elements, surrounding participants' health: 
this can be both of qualitative and quantitative kind, as it includes information 
about participants’ lifestyle, home environment, occupation, diet, as well as the 
 
34 The category of ‘epidemiologist’ is in itself very interesting, as it is diffi-
cult to associate with unique career paths and backgrounds. The epidemiolo-
gists working in EXPOsOMICS I interacted with had slightly different back-
grounds, including medical school, molecular biology and medicine. 
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postcodes of participants, smoking status, etc.35 The macro strategy is thus 
aimed at establishing the dataset comprising health data or covariates as evi-
dence for the study of a specific aspect of the relation between health states and 
the environment. For example, in a recent EXPOsOMICS study published by 
Fiorito and colleagues (Fiorito et al. 2018), the study was performed on data 
collected in the Italian sub-cohort of the EPIC study. The initial step consisted 
in the setup of a case-control study, that is the identification of incident cases 
of cardio- and cerebrovascular disease that arose during the follow-up period 
and the identification of control cases (i.e. free of the outcome of interest), with 
18,982 individuals in total (Fiorito et al. 2018, p. 3). The macro strategy con-
sisted in this identification, supported by background knowledge and other 
work in the literature on the association of cardio- and cerebrovascular disease 
with exposure to air pollution, which yielded evidential claims specifying the 
dataset as evidence for the study of the relation between air pollution and car-
diovascular disease.  
The evidential claims developed through the macro strategy are thus not sta-
tistical claims, nor causal claims, but are rather implicit claims about the initial 
evidential platform for research. This may be one of the reasons why this level 
of investigation is rarely discussed by philosophers of science. However, the 
macro strategy is particularly interesting from a philosophical standpoint be-
cause the epistemic commitments and assumptions made at this stage have a 
significant influence on subsequent research. In EXPOsOMICS, this strategy 
was indeed connected to challenges regarding which kind of data was best 
suited for the study, including considerations about available evidence, choice 
of which cohort studies to focus on and which data to select. Other conceptual 
 
35 Notice that this distinction does not necessarily overlap with a distinction 
between health and environment data. As we will see in the following sub-
sections, exposome researchers have a broader characterisation of what 
counts as environment data, which requires a different strategy. 
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challenges concern the internal comparability of the data collected in cohort 
studies, as often data from cohort studies is collected at quite different points 
in time and may regard participants with quite different backgrounds, home 
environment, etc. One of the ways in which the evidential claims developed 
through this strategy shape the kind of research that is carried out at later 
stages in the project is thus connected to generalisability. Namely, data col-
lected in cohort studies is local by default, having been collected in person 
and/or physically extracted from participants, and this locality is also im-
portant for exposome research, because researchers aim to connect features of 
specific kinds of environment with specific health states of the participants. 
This dialogue between locality and generalisability is stressed multiple times 
in the project, as researchers aim at finding results that are general enough, but, 
at the same time, also sensible to local features. 
3.3.2 The Micro Strategy: Omics, Gis and Experi-
mental Studies 
One of the ways in which the exposome approach is considered innovative is 
the use of molecular data and geographical information systems. These can be 
interpreted as the result of what I call the micro strategy, that is based on an 
approach focused at a lower level of investigation and is aimed at producing 
evidential claims at the individual level of the participants to the studies, their 
surrounding environment and internal molecular environment. The micro 
strategy is thus applied at different points of exposome research and operates 
to generate evidential claims at both ends of the spectrum, i.e. evidence on en-
vironmental pollutants on the one hand and, on the other hand, evidence on 
outcomes of interest (health and disease states). This strategy is particularly 
complex, because it requires significantly different lines of work and generates 
significantly different types of data. 
A first line of research where this approach is applied is what EXPOsOMICS 
researchers called the ‘OMICS labs’. Once the physical samples which form a 
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portion of the health data collected in cohort studies are acquired, they are an-
alysed through omics technologies. These technologies are used to study the 
internal component of the exposome, that is to look for traces of external expo-
sures and potential initial reactions to exposure at the molecular level. Omics 
measurements are performed using methods such as mass spectrometry, 
whose results are visualised in terms of plots with lines and peaks; these peaks 
– also known as features – are indicative of the chemical composition of the 
sample. The result obtained through omic analysis of the samples is, thus, a list 
of molecules per each sample. In exposome research, this is used to get a pic-
ture of the molecular structure of the samples and to thus try to understand the 
potential influence of pollutants on the internal, molecular component of the 
exposome: by looking at the internal level of exposure, researchers aim at spot-
ting the presence of toxicants or reactions to toxicants which is due to exposure 
to pollutants in air or water. The resulting tables of data are usually called ex-
posure or omics profiles; their type will depend on the omics technique used 
for the analysis, which in turn depends on the kind of molecular features re-
searchers intend to focus on for their particular project, on the nature of the 
samples or the process they want to study, as well as on considerations about 
the cost and availability of the chosen omics technologies.36 Some of these tech-
nologies are still at an experimental stage, to the point that a project like 
EXPOsOMICS was in some cases the first project using one of the techniques 
on a large scale. Choices and assumptions will be connected to the specific omic 
technique to be used, as researchers might have to assume the effectiveness 
 
36 EXPOsOMICS researchers spoke of the data produced through omic 
analyses as one of the areas of research where ‘big data’ has an important in-
fluence. Here, the notion of big data is connected to the possibility of getting 
a very large amount of information for a small number of individuals. This is 
usually compared and constrasted to more traditional scenarios – such as, for 
example, cohort studies – where many individuals are studied through a 
smaller number of variables. 
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and validity of the results obtained and often they also face the challenges in-
volved in the availability, cost and effectiveness of the technique. 
The approach I want to highlight here is the focus on a lower level of investi-
gation, as a way of getting to know about the biological structure of samples. 
This is in contrast to the population-level approach used in the macro strategy. 
It produces evidential claims that identify omics data as evidence for the study 
of phenomena connecting environmental exposures and health at the micro-
scopic level, on top of the population level data identified as evidence through 
the first strategy.  
The same strategy is used for evidential claims about environmental pollu-
tants, at the other side of the spectrum of phenomena analysed in exposome 
research. In this case, on the basis of the covariates collected in cohort studies, 
and more precisely the postcodes of the areas where participants lived during 
the study period, exposome researchers generate a new source of evidence to 
describe the structure of the environment that individual participants experi-
enced during the study.  
This line of work within EXPOsOMICS was carried out by the ‘GIS team’, 
whose task is to develop Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to visualise, 
model and analyse geographical data. In the context of EXPOsOMICS, these 
systems were used to generate individual estimates of the chemicals and pol-
lutants that could have been present in the environment and to which each of 
the participants to the cohort could have been exposed (see e.g. Gulliver et al. 
2018). Per se, the postcodes provide an initial picture of where participants 
lived during the study, which is in itself already more specific than most other 
data collected in cohort studies. Cohorts can be very broad and track large ar-
eas of a country, if not more than one country, which may have very different 
kinds of environment and levels of pollutants. On the basis of this more specific 
picture provided by postcodes, the GIS team retrieved data from maps of char-
acteristics of populations that are routinely collected by monitoring stations, 
which are usually located at various city locations in Europe and provide in-
formation on the conditions and features of the area. All these variables are 
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used to inform and tweak a geo-spatial model (developed in the form of a re-
gression model) which, taking into account these variables and differences in 
populations, will assign an estimate of the exposures which every participant 
could have experienced during the study.  
Why is the micro strategy used for environment data? Because, whilst many 
variables about environmental pollutants and exposure are indeed tracked as 
part of cohort studies – also at the individual level –, researchers get a better 
and more precise understanding of exposure through evidence from GIS data. 
Namely, whilst environment data is collected in cohort studies at the individ-
ual level, in questionnaires and one-to-one interviews, its level of resolution 
and precision is not comparable to that of GIS data. At the same time, other 
data available about the environment and presence of chemicals and pollutants 
is rather large, but not very precise and tied to the individual participant. In 
current epidemiology, geo-space modelling is therefore considered the best so-
lution to track pollutants such as particulate air matter and have detailed in-
formation about exposure to it, as no blood biomarkers of toxicants including 
particular matter have been discovered so far. In addition, the epistemic goal 
of the collection of GIS data is to get a level of detail and resolution which is on 
par with omics data. The job of the GIS team was not only to give more detail 
to the environment and exposure data available, but also to level and balance 
the types of data on environment and exposure. The resulting data identified 
by this strategy will indeed be tables of data with estimates for different chem-
ical compounds assigned to the members of the cohort, to an extent mirroring 
the exposure profiles produced by the omics labs. Yet, it is important to note 
that GIS data remains substantially different from omics data, in terms of the 
methods used to generate the data, the richness of the results and the level of 
interdisciplinarity required. Omics profiles can be used light on a variety of 
features of the structure of the molecules under study (see Chapter 4), while 
GIS data provides estimates of the concentrations of single pollutants. On the 
one hand, omics data is the result of analysis of physical samples; GIS data, on 
the other hand, is estimates. Additionally, omics tables are very wide (because 
of all the omics features analysed by these technologies), whilst exposure data 
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on environmental factors will be just one column wide. In EXPOsOMICS, om-
ics data was usually collected by epidemiologists working at the core of the 
research team of the project, whilst the work on GIS data is responsibility of a 
specific team, whose members have significantly different skills and back-
grounds from epidemiology. Still, I argue that the underlying strategy and the 
rationale for its use are the same: understand the microscopic structure of the 
phenomena under study. This complexity is indeed one of the features that sets 
this strategy apart from the other two elements of the typology that I am pre-
senting in the chapter. Complexity also entails that groups of researchers with 
different backgrounds and epistemic skills are involved in the application of 
the strategy, as GIS is a sub-discipline of information systems, the use of omics 
required skills in molecular biology, and statistics is continuously part of the 
picture.  
The same strategy is also applied in the context of the experimental studies 
conducted in exposome research. In EXPOsOMICS, one of the lines of research 
used personal monitoring and tracking devices in relatively controlled envi-
ronments to perform real-time measurements of exposure levels and physio-
logical and immunological variables for a brief period of time (Vineis et al. 
2017a, pp. 148-149). These studies included tracking participants while they 
were, for example, walking in areas with clearly contrasting pollution levels, 
such as Oxford Street and Hyde Park in London, or in a swimming pool, whilst 
exposed to a variety of chemicals (see Espín-Pérez et al. 2018). In these studies, 
the same participants experienced several different conditions, which allowed 
EXPOsOMICS researchers to look at high effects of exposure, as opposed to 
long-term effects that are tracked through cohort studies.  
The micro strategy thus enables exposome researchers to develop evidential 
claims about microscopic structures at the individual level of participants and 
their surrounding environment. The strategy is designed to produce claims 
about the presence or absence of pollutants, to be integrated with the evidential 
claims at the macro level and for tuning the regression model that I introduce 
in the next subsection. In the case of Fiorito and colleagues example (Fiorito  et 
al. 2018), the internal and the external components of the exposome – external 
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exposure to air pollution and internal presence of pollutants or reactions – were 
measured using omic analyses and GIS. For omics data, proteomics and whole 
DNA methylation were performed to identify inflammation-related proteins 
to be used as biomarkers for inflammation and other reactions to external ex-
posure. For environment data, the GIS team generated estimates of air pollu-
tion concentrations at the postcode areas of the participants to the study, more 
specifically for the exposures to NO2, NOx and PM2.5. This allowed researchers 
to study the features of the exposome and environment at the individual level 
of the participants to the study, elaborating evidential claims of the kind “these 
exposure profiles are evidence for the pathways of air toxicants and cardiovas-
cular disease”. In other words, these evidential claims identify a dataset (“ex-
posure profiles”) as evidence of the existence or the study of phenomena at the 
microscopic level of investigation (“pathways of air toxicants and cardiovas-
cular disease”). The example shows one of features of the micro strategy that 
may be connected with causality. One way of interpreting the evidential claims 
of this strategy is namely in causal terms, in the sense that, to an extent, these 
evidential claims can be used to later identify causal relations in the compli-
cated web of relations between presence of pollutants in the environment, ex-
posure, reactions to exposure and (potentially) development of disease. In 
exposome research, the theoretical background of the use of molecular data is 
usually discussed in terms of a methodological approach known as the ‘‘meet 
in the middle approach’’ (Chadeau-Hyam et al. 2011), whose goal is to investi-
gate what lies ‘in the middle’ of the associations between exposure and out-
comes of interest and therefore complement and test the causal nature of sta-
tistical associations. A way of interpreting the strategy is thus in terms of the 
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study of causal relations, together with the more general goal of getting to 
know about the structural elements of the samples to be used as evidence.37 
3.3.3 The Association Strategy: Regression Analysis 
and Data Integration 
The epistemic goals of epidemiological research on the exposome are con-
nected to public health and, more specifically, exposure assessment. This is 
why EXPOsOMICS researchers usually discussed ‘results’ for their work only 
for the evidential claims produced by what I call the association strategy. This 
strategy is based on an approach focused at the level of associations between 
the environment and outcomes of interest and can be seen as an integration of 
the claims that are made as part of the macro and micro strategies. The data 
specified by the evidential claims generated through the other strategies is 
used in a regression model, looking for associations between environmental 
features and toxicants on the one hand and health outcomes on the other. In 
EXPOsOMICS the regression model typically looked at one exposure and one 
omics feature at a time. This means that, for example, each of the 4000 features 
that can be measured in metabolomics was modelled in association with envi-
ronment data. Then, the data analysts of EXPOsOMICS looked at those models 
where the association was statistically significant, after taking into account 
that, whilst doing thousands of tests, some would look statistically significant 
by chance. From that, EXPOsOMICS researchers could for instance find that 
about 170 out of the 4000 features were associated with a specific outcome or 
set of phenomena. 
 
37 Vineis (2015) says that the meet in the middle approach is a “very rudi-
mentary approach to causality”, but links it to the work of Wesley Salmon on 
the propagations of marks and causal processes (Vineis 2015, p. 720).  
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These models are typically developed through a mix of univariate and multi-
variate methods.38 They are based on the assumption that the prediction of the 
outcome of interest is a matter of multiple factors: for example, when using 
omics data, models will be based on the assumption that a pool of different 
omic features will predict the outcome of interest better than each of them sep-
arately or their sum. These models are thus not primarily causal: their goal is 
prediction, and more specifically exposome researchers are after the model that 
best predicts the outcomes of interest, taking into consideration the omics var-
iables jointly, as opposed to using one by one or summing the predictions sep-
arately. The models will be adjusted on the basis of the data generated at the 
individual level. For example, the data produced through the second strategy 
and the experimental studies is used to try and see, when the exposure is mod-
elled, how well the actual exposure a participant was exposed to can be pre-
dicted, as a way to try to make sure that what is modelled is in the range of 
what was measured.  
The models generate the space of correlations and associations pertaining to 
the context of the specific study that exposome researchers are conducting. The 
resulting evidential claims thus have a statistical character because they specify 
statistical data. The goals and importance of these evidential claims are to be 
seen in in the context of the ongoing revision of exposure, such as air or water 
quality standards. They are evidential claims about the associated trends be-
tween environment and health/disease, in the sense that they look for the con-
stituents and internal features of the datasets built through the other two strat-
egies. More specifically, they are evidential claims which identify a specific set 
of statistical data as evidence for a phenomenon, such as the relation between 
exposure to air pollution and cardio- and cerebrovascular disease risk, as me-
diated by oxidative stress and inflammation, in Fiorito and colleagues’ study. 
 
38 For an overview of the statistical methods used for the study of the expo-
some, see Chadeau-Hyam et al. (2013). 
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These claims have a primarily statistical nature but may potentially be inter-
preted causally thanks to a causal interpretation of the results obtained by the 
micro strategy.  
Although the results of this strategy are statistical claims, they are not the result 
of the work of statisticians only. Statisticians do play a key role at this stage, 
especially in the building of the tools and the models, but it is data analysts 
who run the models and perform the data analysis that will deliver the eviden-
tial claims. Like the other two strategies, the association strategy involves the 
working of different groups of individuals (as can be inferred by the long list 
of authors of published results). Researchers face various conceptual chal-
lenges when using this strategy. One involves the level of comparability be-
tween the estimates of exposure developed through the model and the omics 
data based on the samples collected in cohort studies, as we have seen in the 
context of the micro strategy. Other questions concern the role of integration 
and especially data integration. In EXPOsOMICS, researchers used a number 
of statistical tools to first of all integrate and analyse data collected in the cohort 
studies and, in a second step, integrate health and exposure data in order to try 
and find associations. The kind of data integration used at this stage regarded 
data concerning different phenomena – outcomes of interest, exposure, the en-
vironment, disease – and was aimed at making comparisons, identifying com-
mon elements or associations and studying relations stretching across this set 
of phenomena.  
The ways in which exposome researchers tend to frame and present their re-
sults might suggest that the only evidential claims that actually matter are 
those presented as the results of the study, which in Fiorito and colleagues’ 
case would be the evidence for the association between exposure to air pollu-
tion and cardio- and cerebrovascular disease risk. This would in a way come 
close to EXPOsOMICS researchers’ view of their research, but I argue that it 
would provide a too simple and, in a way, misleading picture of their work. 
Namely, whilst what are presented as results of a study are indeed evidential 
claims, these are just one type of evidential claims, which is in turn based on 
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other types of claims and relying on different strategies. Although the associa-
tion-level strategy might end up being the one that produces claims that have 
the most impact on further research, it should not be overlooked that this is 
crucially linked to the claims generated by the macro and micro strategies.  
3.4 Epidemiology, Evidence and Causality 
I have here reconstructed data practices in contemporary epidemiological re-
search on the exposome in terms of evidential claims, presenting a typology of 
different approaches, methods, lines of work.  
The way in which I have structured the subsections and I referred to examples 
from research in EXPOsOMICS might suggest that the strategies are neces-
sarily subsequent and that they are exhaustive of all the aspects of an exposome 
study. However, as summarised by Figure 2, this is not necessarily the case. 
Firstly, the strategies are interrelated in both subsequent and non-linear ways, 
through at least two different types of relations. The first is rather straightfor-
ward: the evidential claims generated through the macro and micro strategy 
provide data that is used as evidence in, respectively, the micro and association 
strategy (see the curved arrows). Yet, the macro and micro strategies are also 
individually connected to the association strategy through a relation of influ-
ence and specification, as the epistemic commitments and assumptions made 
in the macro and micro strategies limit the kind of the evidential claims that 
can be generated through the association strategy (see the dashed arrows). 
Namely, the evidential claims of the macro and micro strategies provide a con-
strain to the generalisability of the evidential claims of the association strate-
gies, for instance in terms of the size and type of case-control study specified 
by the macro strategy and the assumptions of data production of the micro 
strategy. As a result, the strategies are not mutually exclusive and are interre-
late in non-linear ways. Figure 2 summarises these two relations and, in addi-
tion, visualises within each individual strategy the relation between data and 
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evidential claims, in terms of a two-fold relation of evidential support and data 
specification.  
  
Figure 2. Reconstruction of the relations between the macro, micro and association strategies. 
As for exhaustivity, it is important to note that this typology is a philosophical 
analysis of the epistemic characteristics and goals of exposome research, that I 
reconstruct in terms of three epistemic strategies used to generate evidential 
claims. As a result of this focus, my typology is not exhaustive of all the ways 
in which exposome research can be performed. Moreover, some of the strate-
gies could stand on their own and be used to generate evidential claims whose 
value does not have to be linked to another strategy (such as the macro strat-
egy). Sometimes, researchers may as well be unable to use all the three strate-
gies, for instance as a consequence of the type of data they work with, and may 
have to employ other approaches.  
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Nonetheless, I claim that my approach is a fruitful perspective which distin-
guishes between different strategies for evidential claims and emphasises the 
complexity of research carried out in contemporary epidemiology. In doing so, 
it improves philosophical understandings of epidemiology. My emphasis on 
evidence production as a crucial goal of epidemiological research is different 
from many philosophical analyses, which have so far mostly interpreted epi-
demiological research in causal terms. This focus on causation and causal in-
ference has yielded important work and has had the merit of putting epidemi-
ology on the map of disciplines of interest to philosophy of science. Addition-
ally, it has led philosophers to study epidemiological practice and methodol-
ogy, to collaborate with epidemiologists and directly engage in current discus-
sions in the scientific literature, which is in and of itself a significant result.39 
Plus, this focus is coherent with the ‘end goal’ of epidemiology, that is inter-
vening on populations to improve public health: one wants to know about 
causes of disease affecting public health to intervene on them. Whilst I do not 
want to contrast this, I also think that it would not be charitable to interpret all 
epidemiological research as primarily concerned with causality or to focus 
only on causal claims. An analysis based only on causality focuses for the most 
part on the end results of epidemiological research and may thus end up over-
looking the crucial epistemic role of other elements and claims that proceed 
final results but make them possible and significantly influence them. Investi-
gating the role of data and evidence in epidemiology as one of the central out-
puts and results of research enables to shed lights on these issues, which are 
 
39 See, for instance, the work of Federica Russo and Phyllis Illari on their 
information transmission account of causation, in collaboration with Paolo 
Vineis (Illari and Russo 2016; Russo and Vineis 2016; Vineis et al. 2017b), and 
the work of Alex Broadbent with various colleagues on the potential out-
comes approach (Vandenbroucke et al. 2016; Fuller et al. 2016).  
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most important in the context of life and health sciences contributing to evi-
dence used in policy.  
In addition, by bringing forward the notion of evidential claims, I have tried to 
sketch a particular philosophical perspective on evidence. In Wylie’s view, ev-
idential claims relate material traces to phenomena of the past, identifying 
traces as evidence for the existence of the phenomena. In the chapter, I have 
used this notion to interpret data practices in contemporary epidemiology as 
relying on claims that identify a dataset as evidence for the study of phenom-
ena. The use of this notion of evidential claims in the context of exposome re-
search points to a view evidence as: the product of various epistemic practices, 
claims and considerations (epistemic strategies, levels of abstraction, assump-
tions, types of data, commitments, etc.); and as a category that identifies spe-
cific data to be used for specific purposes. In this sense, evidence is not to be 
seen as a necessarily fixed and stable entity, and neither as synonym with data. 
Rather, claims that identify a dataset as evidence of something are a way of 
expressing knowledge on the world. In the context of discussions about the 
relation between data and knowledge, Leonelli distinguishes between embod-
ied knowledge, i.e. the knowing how that is required to interpret data and use 
it as evidence, and propositional knowledge, that is knowledge about reality 
(Leonelli 2013, p. 505). The strategies for evidential claims that I have presented 
here are indeed aimed at expressing knowledge, but at the same time retain a 
very close link to the data and have a rather loose and implicit propositional 
character. The evidential claims I have analysed are centred around the speci-
fication of datasets that can be used as evidence in the context of a research 
hypothesis. They crucially require the deployment of various aspects of em-
bodied knowledge, both in terms of skills to be deployed during research and 
the use of existing knowledge and literature. They involve activities including 
the production, collection and retrieval of data. To use Leonelli’s framework, 
the evidential claims generated in EXPOsOMICS would therefore be an in-
stance of propositional knowledge, but understanding these claims as eviden-
tial claims provides a specification of the rather broad notion of propositional 
knowledge: evidential claims are very close to the data used as evidence and 
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are not full-fledged knowledge claims. At the same time, the interpretation of 
one of the goals of data practices in terms of evidential claims enables to specify 
some of the processes that lie within Leonelli’s account of data, as material ar-
tefacts that can be used as evidence for claims about phenomena and can be 
circulated among individuals (Leonelli 2016a). I have suggested that this use 
can be interpreted as the generation of evidential claims, which gives a more 
specific perspective of what it means for data to get used as evidence in con-
temporary epidemiology.  
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have argued that several aspects of epidemiological research 
on the exposome can be interpreted in terms of the development of evidential 
claims and can be reconstructed in terms of strategies for generating evidential 
claims. I have distinguished between three strategies. The macro strategy iden-
tifies the initial evidence platform, generating scoping claims that restrict the 
sample and provide an initial understanding of the phenomena to focus on. As 
part of the micro strategy, significantly different kinds of data are collected, 
with the common aim of identifying structure at microscopic level and elabo-
rating evidential claims about the microscopic structure of things. On the basis 
of the evidential claims generated by the first two strategies, the association 
level provides evidential claims at the statistical level, concerning associations 
between exposure to the environment and outcomes of interest.  
I have argued that this focus on evidential claims provides a different perspec-
tive if compared with existing philosophical work on epidemiology, that has 
vastly focused on causality and causal inference. Choosing strategies for evi-
dential claims as units of a philosophical analysis makes it possible to identify 
the epistemic role of lines of work that are usually neglected in philosophical 
analyses (such as the macro strategy), thus allowing for a broader appreciation 
of research carried out in projects like EXPOsOMICS, their relevance to achiev-
ing epistemic goals and building a larger body of knowledge. And it enables 
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to identify and unpack conceptual choices and issues involved at almost every 
step of research. An additional insight of my analysis is connected to the epis-
temic dimension of the evidential claims generated on the exposome, and 
where they fit in considerations about data and scientific knowledge. I have 
argued that my approach sketches a view of evidence as a category which iden-
tifies the use of data for specific purposes and thus is positioned in between 
data and empirical knowledge. I have argued that this gives a specific perspec-
tive of how data is used as evidence in contemporary epidemiology, with a 
special focus on the data-centric research on the exposome. By focusing on this 
case, I also hope to contribute to the improvement of philosophical under-
standings of the epistemic role of data in the sciences, particularly in data-in-
tensive settings, which run the risk of interpreting an increase in the volume of 
data as an automatic improvement in the quality and quantity of evidence.  
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Chapter 4 
Evaluating Evidential Pluralism in Epi-
demiology: Mechanistic Evidence in 
Exposome Research 
 
Abstract: In current philosophical discussions on evidence in the medical sci-
ences, epidemiology has been used to exemplify a specific version of evidential 
pluralism. According to this view, known as the Russo–Williamson Thesis, ev-
idence of both difference-making and mechanisms is produced to make causal 
claims in the health sciences. In this paper, I present an analysis of data and 
evidence in epidemiological practice, with a special focus on research on the 
exposome, and I cast doubt on the extent to which evidential pluralism holds 
in this case. I start by focusing on the claim that molecular data allows for the 
production of mechanistic evidence. On the basis of a close look at the ways in 
which molecular data is used in exposome research, I caution against interpre-
tations in terms of mechanistic evidence. Secondly, I expand my critical re-
marks on the thesis by addressing the conditions under which data is catego-
rised as evidence in exposome research. I argue that these show that the clas-
sification of a dataset as a type of evidence is dependent on the ways in which 
the data is used. This is in contrast with the approach of evidential pluralism, 
where evidence is classified in different types on the basis of its intrinsic prop-
erties. Finally, I come back to what I consider the core of the thesis and suggest 
that the epidemiological research analysed in the paper indicates different in-
terpretations of evidential pluralism and its applicability in the health sciences. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Evidence is a notion that we associate with multiple activities of our societies, 
including journalism, law, criminal investigations, etc. Evidence is an im-
portant issue when we want to use or produce knowledge. Science is therefore 
one of the areas where we would intuitively say that evidence plays a crucial 
role, and one may be even tempted to say that the use of evidence is among the 
features that characterises practices as scientific in the first place. 
The topic of evidence has received philosophical attention primarily in episte-
mology and philosophy of science (Kelly 2016). In philosophy of science, many 
discussions have focused on the health sciences. This is partly a consequence 
of the rise of the methodological approach known as evidence-based medicine, 
which has brought about new ways of assessing the quality of evidence and 
provoked many critical reflections in the literature (Worrall 2002; Clarke et al. 
2013; Stegenga 2014). As a result of this debate, a number of authors started to 
discuss how to classify evidence produced in medical research, connecting the 
issue to more general issues in philosophy of science, such as causality and 
causal inference (Campaner and Galavotti 2012). 
Within this debate on causal inference and evidence classification in medicine, 
Federica Russo and Jon Williamson introduced a version of evidential plural-
ism according to which: 
To establish causal claims, scientists need the mutual support of 
mechanisms and dependencies. … The idea is that probabilistic ev-
idence needs to be accounted for by an underlying mechanism be-
fore the causal claim can be established. (Russo and Williamson 
2007, p. 159) 
The ‘Russo-Williamson Thesis’ (RWT) identifies evidence of two kinds – evi-
dence of causes making a difference to effects and evidence of underlying 
mechanisms – which has to be provided to make causal claims in the health 
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sciences.40 A number of examples have been used to illustrate the thesis, in-
cluding research from epidemiology (Russo and Williamson 2012). Epidemiol-
ogy can be defined as the area of the health sciences concerned with the study 
of the distribution and determinants of health states – particularly disease – in 
human populations (Broadbent 2013). Philosophers of science have recently 
turned their attention to epidemiology and related problems, including: the 
notion of cause in epidemiology (Russo 2009; De Vreese 2009); the causal inter-
pretation of epidemiological results (Broadbent 2013); causal explanations 
(Campaner 2011); and the consequences of methodological novelties on causal 
inference (Broadbent 2015; Vandenbroucke et al. 2016). In this context, the 
RWT has played an important role, connecting philosophical work on epide-
miology with the broader debate on medical evidence, where epidemiology 
had largely been overlooked, despite being among the most important sources 
of medical evidence. 
In this paper, I present a critical analysis of the RWT from the perspective of 
contemporary epidemiological research on the exposome. The exposome ap-
proach combines data on the molecular and external environment to study the 
internal and external components of exposure and improve the assessment of 
disease risks associated with environmental elements. It has recently attracted 
significant attention and has been used as a source of examples in the literature 
on the RWT (Russo and Williamson 2012; Russo and Vineis 2016). My analysis 
 
40 As noted by one reviewer, a few different versions of the thesis have been 
proposed since the original formulation by Russo and Williamson, and this 
can generate some confusion. Thus, let me state that this general interpreta-
tion of the thesis is the one I shall adopt throughout the chapter. 
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of this line of research is based on the study of a specific project: EXPOsOM-
ICS.41 The project received funding by the European Commission in 2012 and, 
between 2012 and 2017, it was carried out by as a consortium of research cen-
tres in Europe and the US, coordinated by Imperial College London. 
EXPOsOMICS aimed at improving the assessment of exposure to air and water 
pollution and their impact on chronic disease, by studying and integrating in-
ternal and external components of exposure (Vineis et al. 2017a). The project 
can be considered a paradigmatic example of exposome research, as it was 
built on data collected by several other projects studying the exposome, with 
which it shares approaches and methods.42 At the same time, the aim of inte-
grating data from these diverse sources to produce evidence on environmental 
exposure makes the project a particularly significant case in the context of dis-
cussions on data and evidence (Fleming et al. 2017). 
 
41 My study is empirically grounded on the study of EXPOsOMICS publi-
cations, reports, presentations. In addition, I conducted a series of qualitative 
interviews, which took place at the MRC-PHE Centre for Environment and 
Health of Imperial College London and aimed to document practices of data 
collection, production and integration and notions and classifications of evi-
dence. Quotations from these interviews are taken from transcripts; full tran-
scripts of the interviews are available upon request. In this chapter, I will use 
the empirical material to provide a reconstruction of uses of molecular data 
and approaches to evidence classification in EXPOsOMICS. A more detailed 
empirical analysis of the ways in which data is collected, interpreted and used 
in the project can be found in Chapter 3.  
42  See for instance the Helix project, a cohort study looking at the ‘early-life 
exposome’, which some EXPOsOMICS researchers helped set up (Maitre et 
al. 2018).   
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My analysis will proceed as follows. I start by introducing the exposome ap-
proach and the way in which the RWT has been presented in this context (Sect. 
4.2). I then turn to my critical remarks on the extent to which the RWT holds 
up in this case. I present challenges to two main aspects of the interpretation of 
exposome research based on the RWT, one pertaining to the interpretation of 
molecular data as mechanistic evidence and another to the way evidence is 
classified in the RWT framework. Firstly, in Sect. 4.3, I consider the claim that 
new sources of molecular data used in exposome research count as the produc-
tion of mechanistic evidence and that, therefore, exposome research shows the 
interplay between mechanistic and difference-making evidence suggested by 
the RWT. On the basis of a detailed look at molecular data in EXPOsOMICS, I 
show that molecular data is used to study differences and dependencies of ex-
posure and cast doubt on interpretations in terms of mechanistic evidence. Sec-
ondly, in Sect. 4.4, I consider the way in which the RWT distinguishes between 
different types of evidence. I focus on the ways in which data is used and clas-
sified as evidence in EXPOsOMICS and I argue that this presents more general 
challenges to the approach to evidence classification of the RTW framework. 
On the basis of these criticisms, in Sect. 4.5, I come back to the ‘core’ of the RWT 
and ask if it can be reconciled with the challenges highlighted in the paper. I 
argue that this may be possible and the case of exposome research indicates 
different ways of interpreting evidential pluralism and its applicability. 
4.2 Exposome Research and Evidential Plu-
ralism 
First introduced by Christopher Wild (2005), the exposome refers to the totality 
of exposures experienced by individuals throughout their lifetime. Totality, 
here, means that the exposome encompasses exposures experienced at differ-
ent levels, which include exposures to elements and features of the external 
environment (such as pollution, diet, stress, etc.) as well as the internal chemi-
cal environment (such as inflammation, oxidative stress, gut flora, etc.). These 
 Evaluating Evidential Pluralism in Epidemiology: Mechanistic Evidence in Exposome Re-
search 
 96 
different levels exist because individuals’ exposure to external elements can 
produce toxicants and/or reactions at the internal level, which can in turn lead 
to the development of disease. In contrast with the more traditional focus on 
the external components of exposure, the ‘all-encompassing’ approach to the 
exposome is often presented as a new paradigm in the context of environmen-
tal epidemiology (Rappaport and Smith 2010). 
Practically, much of the work on the exposome consists in the search for bi-
omarkers, i.e., elements of the environment or the organism that can be meas-
ured and in turn measure the presence of some toxicant. Biomarkers are con-
sidered capable of signalling the development of disease, thus guiding re-
searchers in the understanding of the impact of the environment on disease.43 
In this context, molecular data is among the primary tools used to identify bi-
omarkers of the internal component of exposure. More precisely, exposome re-
searchers use omics technologies to measure the different levels at which ex-
posure from environmental elements leaves traces in the body, including: pro-
cesses that involve small molecules playing intermediary roles in the function-
ing of the metabolism (metabolomics); parts of proteins or DNA that are bound 
to specific chemicals (adductomics); epigenetic changes in the cells’ genetic ma-
terial (epigenomics); mRNA expressions (transcriptomics) and proteins (prote-
omics). 
Recently, Federica Russo and epidemiologist Paolo Vineis have connected the 
use of molecular data in exposome research to the RWT. They say that “molec-
ular epidemiology improves on traditional epidemiology also in another im-
portant respect: it goes beyond associations and is in principle able to shed light 
on the mechanisms of disease causation” (Russo and Vineis 2016, p. 254; empha-
sis in original). Similar considerations have been developed elsewhere in the 
literature on the RWT. In one of the first publications including a philosophical 
 
43 For a discussion of working definitions and the conceptual status of bi-
omarkers, see Strimbu and Travel (2010). 
 Chapter 4 
 97 
analysis of exposome research, Russo and Williamson (2012) claim that this 
line of research shows an interplay between difference-making and mechanis-
tic evidence. Together with Phyllis Illari, Russo and Vineis use the exposome 
approach to cancer research to argue for an information transmission account 
of causality and talk of the need for evidence of both the difference that expo-
sure makes to the development of cancer and of how exposure leads to the 
development of cancer (Vineis et al. 2017b).44  
In this context, the significance of Russo and Vineis’ claim is that exposome 
research can produce – and it does not only use – mechanistic evidence, and that 
this production is to be seen in the molecular features of exposome research.45 
In this sense, exposome research is innovative compared to traditional epide-
miology (also) because, thanks to molecular data, it does not only produce new 
difference-making evidence but also mechanistic evidence. In other words, the 
claim is not that exposome research uses mechanistic evidence that has been 
gathered in other areas of biomedical research and that this, together with the 
difference making evidence it produces, shows the interplay maintained by ev-
idential pluralism. Rather, the argument is that the exposome approach im-
proves on traditional epidemiology because it can study the mechanisms of 
disease causation and, thus, produce mechanistic evidence. It is this claim 
about the production of a specific kind of evidence that will be the target of my 
critique in the next section. 
Before presenting my remarks, let me briefly summarise the distinction be-
tween difference-making and mechanistic evidence developed by the RWT. 
 
44 For a presentation of Illari and Russo's information transmission account, 
see Illari (2011b) and Illari and Russo (2016). 
45 I will come back this distinction between use and production of evidence 
and why it is important in Sect. 4.5. 
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Evidence of difference-making refers to evidence that is used to show that ef-
fects depend on causes and that causes make a difference to effect (Russo and 
Williamson 2007, p. 158). Randomised controlled trials are among the most 
cited examples of a methodology producing difference-making evidence. 
Other examples, from Illari (2011a), include evidence gathered in observational 
studies, probability distributions in Bayesian networks, as well as counterfac-
tual and invariant relationships. As such, Russo and Williamson say that dif-
ference-making often comes in a probabilistic form and is usually employed to 
make predictions.46  
As for mechanistic evidence, Russo and Williamson suggest that we should 
think of it as evidence of the mechanism(s) underlying the relation between 
causes and effects. Mechanistic evidence is what provides the productive com-
ponent of causal claims, which gives information on how causes bring about 
effects. They also argue that this is the kind of evidence which plays the crucial 
role of helping with issues possibly affecting difference-making evidence, such 
as confounding (Russo and Williamson 2012, pp. 249–250). This notion of 
mechanistic evidence has often been criticised because of its vagueness and 
ambiguity, which has in turn led to disambiguating work in the literature on 
the RWT. For example, Illari argues that we should not think of the distinction 
between difference-making and mechanistic evidence as a distinction between 
the methods we use to gather evidence, but rather as a difference between ob-
jects of evidence (Illari 2011a). In her view, mechanistic evidence is not neces-
sarily the evidence we get through, say, interventions, as opposed to observa-
tional studies. Rather, mechanistic evidence is evidence of the existence of 
 
46 Russo and Williamson sometimes use the term probabilistic evidence in-
stead of difference-making evidence. For matters of consistency, I will follow 
their original claim on the connection of probabilistic evidence with causes 
making a difference to effects and, in line with Illari (2011a), I will only use 
the term difference-making evidence. 
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mechanisms, evidence that is about mechanism and has mechanisms as its’ ob-
ject. Following her and Williamson’s characterisation, evidence of mechanisms 
thus refers to evidence of the entities, activities or the way these are organised 
to produce the phenomenon for which the mechanism is responsible (Illari and 
Williamson 2012). In this view, potential mechanistic evidence for, say, protein 
synthesis would be evidence of the organised entities (DNA, RNA, ribosomes, 
etc.) and activities (e.g. transcription, regulation, etc.) involved in the mecha-
nism that brings about the synthesis of proteins. 
Despite these disambiguating efforts, the evidential pluralism proposed by the 
RWT has received significant criticism in the literature, especially with regard 
to the strong stance on mechanistic evidence. For example, Howick (2011) has 
casted doubt on the claim that mechanistic evidence has always to be provided 
in order to establish causal claims. In the philosophy of epidemiology, Broad-
bent (2011) has argued against mechanistic interpretations of the causal infer-
ence strategies used by epidemiologists. Gillies (2011) has shown that the epi-
demiological discovery of the causal relation between smoking and lung-can-
cer was first established on the basis of difference-making evidence only, much 
earlier than any mechanism was found. 
4.3 Mechanistic Evidence in Exposome Re-
search 
The use of molecular data in exposome research has been interpreted as the 
production of mechanistic evidence, which is considered necessary by the 
RWT to support a causal claim. I now give a close look at how molecular data 
is collected and used in exposome research, focusing on examples of the use of 
exposure profiles from molecular data in EXPOsOMICS. This analysis leads 
me to argue that, in the context of EXPOsOMICS, evidence from molecular data 
is not really used as mechanistic evidence, at least if we are to follow the notion 
of mechanistic evidence developed in the RWT literature. 
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In EXPOsOMICS, molecular data was collected through the analysis of the mi-
croscopic structure of samples from cohort studies. For example, blood plasma 
samples retrieved from cohort studies were analysed using the adductomics 
technique, i.e., by collecting data on protein adducts, which are formed by the 
binding of proteins to chemicals, in order to study the effects of exposure to air 
pollution on proteins. As one EXPOsOMICS researcher explained: 
Adductomics is an omic technique and the specificity of the method 
is that it measures adducts of human serum albumin and toxicants. 
The toxicants present in your serum tend to have a very fast turna-
round, so they disappear and they become metabolite and they’re 
very difficult to measure. So, for example, if you’ve been exposed to 
air pollution it’s going to be difficult to find the related toxicant in 
your serum. But the same molecules can bind to albumin and then 
they are conserved in your serum for a longer period of time. So, by 
measuring these adducts, you can track exposure for longer time. 
(Researcher A1) 
Results consist in spectrometry data, i.e., plots with lines and peaks, where dif-
ferent peaks correspond to different molecules and break down the sample into 
its molecular elements and compounds. These are usually called ‘exposure 
profiles’ or ’omic profiles’. On the basis of exposure profiles, researchers try to 
identify toxicants whose presence can be considered a consequence of expo-
sures to external pollutants and can in turn be used as an intermediate bi-
omarker to track the effects of exposure and possibly the development of dis-
ease. Exposure profiles are usually presented as tables where lines are dedi-
cated to chemicals and the content of the columns provides information on the 
measured mass of the chemical within the sample. 
As we have seen, according to the disambiguated notion provided by Illari, 
mechanistic evidence is the kind of evidence that has mechanisms as its object 
(Illari 2011a); and, following Illari’s work with Williamson, a mechanism for a 
phenomenon consists in the entities and activities organised in order to be re-
sponsible for the phenomenon (Illari and Williamson 2012). The first problem 
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I see in interpreting evidence from exposure profiles as mechanistic evidence 
is precisely that the ‘object’ is not a mechanism, to use Illari’s language. The 
rationale behind the use of molecular data in exposome research is to look for 
chemicals whose presence may be due to an exposure to the external environ-
ment, not to look for the ways in which these chemicals are organized to form 
mechanisms. From the perspective of Illari and Williamson’ notion of mecha-
nism, one may say that researchers do look for entities – yet, they do not really 
look at the activities these carry out, as molecular profiles provide a static pic-
ture, and not even at the organisation of these entities as part of a mechanism. 
In EXPOsOMICS, exposure profiles were rather used to provide evidence for 
claims about the dependency of the molecular presence of toxicants on external 
exposure and to find out about the difference that the environmental exposures 
experienced by individuals make to the presence of these toxicants. These fea-
tures place molecular evidence very close to difference-making evidence, of 
which dependency and difference are core elements, and quite apart from evi-
dence of mechanisms linking exposure and disease. 
More generally, the context where molecular evidence was used in EXPOsOM-
ICS is the identification of associations between pollutants and aspects of 
health and disease, rather than the discovery of mechanisms. Exposure profiles 
were used in regression models as evidence about toxicants at the molecular 
level, in order to find associations with the presence of toxicants at the external 
level. One EXPOsOMICS researcher explained this whilst talking about mod-
elling molecular data from metabolomics to study the effects of environmental 
exposures on birth weight: 
Each model models the relation of birth weight to that metabolic 
feature, so what's the change of birth weight with that metabolite, 
once you take into account covariates like the mum's weight, the 
mum's education and all these things (Researcher B1; my emphasis).  
The focus here is on changes and differences, rather than on how these differ-
ences are brought about or through which mechanisms. 
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In addition, one of the characteristic features of mechanistic evidence, as de-
fined in the RWT framework, does not seem to be supported by molecular data. 
As argued by Illari (2011a), mechanistic evidence is crucial for causal inference 
because it helps with issues affecting difference-making evidence, including 
confounding. However, this feature is not supported by exposure profiles, 
which on the contrary are affected by issues that typically affect difference-
making evidence. I take this point from the scientific literature on molecular 
evidence, where for instance Vineis and Perera say that one of the problems 
related to the use of omics as intermediate biomarkers is confounding: 
One of the main challenges with intermediate biomarkers is to un-
derstand whether they belong to the causal pathway between expo-
sure and disease, whether they are simply a side effect of exposure 
or disease, or whether their measurement is confounded by some 
other exposure. (Vineis and Perera 2007, p. 1961) 
The emphasis on difference making and problems of confounding in exposome 
research are the reasons why I caution against interpreting molecular data as 
mechanistic evidence. One may still say that there is a simpler and weaker 
claim that can be defended, namely that molecular data in exposome research 
hints at where to look for mechanisms and this is enough to say that it counts 
as mechanistic evidence. In this view, evidence from exposure profiles would 
count as mechanistic because it hints at the presence of entities involved in un-
derlying mechanisms. The claim, however, is problematic even in this weaker 
form, as it is not clear how molecular data hinting at a mechanism would count 
as the kind of mechanistic evidence defined by the RWT. To call mechanistic 
evidence something that hints at mechanisms would imply to stretch the no-
tion of mechanistic evidence too much, up to a point where the notion itself 
loses most of its power. It would imply going beyond the notion of mechanistic 
evidence put forward by Illari (2011a), which is already quite broad. One may 
say that my contention about mechanistic evidence may be too stringent and 
suggest that, in constrained areas of research like exposome research, even just 
providing hints at mechanisms could count as production of mechanistic evi-
dence or mechanistic explanations. Still, as I explain here, I struggle to see how 
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evidence hinting at mechanisms could count as the mechanistic evidence de-
fined by the RWT. If one wants to look at the case from the perspective of mech-
anistic explanations, I would rather say that the molecular data used in 
EXPOsOMICS plays the role of a heuristic for finding mechanisms, as no mech-
anism seems to be discovered directly, or that is part of how-possibly mecha-
nistic explanations (Forber 2010; Reydon 2012). Moreover, mechanisms can of-
ten be discovered on the basis of types of evidence such as difference-making 
evidence and manipulative evidence, rather than mechanistic evidence (Cam-
paner and Galavotti 2012). 
4.4 Classifying Evidence in Exposome Re-
search 
Whilst critically analysing interpretations of molecular data as mechanistic ev-
idence, I have put significant emphasis on the context of the use of molecular 
data as evidence in EXPOsOMICS. Building on this approach, in this section I 
expand my analysis and make a more general point on evidence classification. 
I intend to show that, in the context of data practices in EXPOsOMICS, what 
makes a difference for the classification of data as evidence of a specific kind is 
the way in which the data is used. I argue that this is in contrast with how 
evidence is differentiated in the RWT framework. I therefore expand my criti-
cal remarks on the RWT by pointing to more general issues in the way medical 
evidence is framed in the thesis. 
In the literature on the RWT, a specific type of evidence is usually linked to a 
specific method for the generation of evidence. This suggests that the notion of 
evidence employed by the RWT is close to traditional philosophical accounts 
of evidence and data. In these views, data counts as evidence on the basis of 
intrinsic properties, that are fixed and inherently local and stand in a represen-
tational relation with aspects of reality, independently of the context in which 
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the data is used.47 These views have recently been challenged by Sabina Leo-
nelli, who has argued that data should rather be considered a relational notion 
with a non-representational character (Leonelli 2015, 2016, pp. 69–92). When 
asked about notions and classifications of evidence, EXPOsOMICS researchers 
discussed these issues in the context of considerations about the data used in 
the project, and more specifically the ways in which they use, analyse, aggre-
gate and disseminate their data. Thus, I now introduce the various types and 
sources of data researchers work with in exposome projects like EXPOsOMICS. 
In the previous section, whilst analysing the use of molecular data, I have men-
tioned that the starting point for those analyses is data retrieved from cohort 
studies. In EXPOsOMICS (as in most epidemiology), cohort studies were one 
of the crucial and initial sources of data. Cohort studies follow a population of 
interest – the cohort of participants – for a long period of time, during which 
extraction of physical samples, questionnaires and one-to-one interviews are 
performed to collect data on a number of variables, including clinical states, 
features of participants’ lifestyle, house environment, etc. The types of data 
used in EXPOsOMICS and retrieved from cohort studies varied significantly, 
including: quantitative data, such as measures of chemicals and compounds, 
as well as qualitative data, such as information provided in interviews; data 
about specific individuals as well as data about the surrounding environment; 
physical samples stored in low temperature as well as spreadsheets saved in 
databases. 
As we have seen, some of the data retrieved in cohort studies is analysed to 
study the molecular composition of the internal chemical environment and 
produce exposure profiles. Together with what is directly acquired through 
cohort studies, molecular profiles constitute what EXPOsOMICS researchers 
 
47 A paper by Bogen and Woodward is often cited as a prime example of 
this view (Bogen and Woodward 1988). For more recent and nuanced takes 
on this approach, see e.g. Rheinberger (2011). 
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defined as evidence on population health, or ‘health data’, which is thus com-
posed of various kinds of data, collected at different levels of abstraction, at 
different times, and with different kinds of expertise involved. EXPOsOMICS 
researchers distinguished health data from what they called ‘environment 
data’, i.e., data on the conditions participants were exposed to during the study 
period. As with health data, the starting point is cohort studies, where partici-
pants are asked about the environment where they live and/or work, their life-
style, diet, etc. One of the basic questions that participants to cohort studies are 
asked to provide is the postcode of the area where they live. In EXPOsOMICS, 
this was used to design geographical information systems to produce new data 
about the quantity of toxicants in the cohort’s environment (Vineis et al. 2017a, 
p. 143; Fiorito et al. 2017, pp. 237–238; see also Chapter 3, Sect. 3.3.2). Starting 
from postcodes, and on the basis of maps of characteristics of the population 
(such as density of the population, traffic intensity, whether the area is an in-
dustrial area, etc.), a geo-spatial regression model is designed to take into ac-
count these variables and differences in populations and assign exposure esti-
mates to every participant in the study (Gulliver et al. 2018). 
I argue that the context of data practices in EXPOsOMICS shows that the clas-
sification of a dataset as a specific kind of evidence crucially depends on the 
ways in which the dataset is used as evidence. For example, data from cohort 
studies can be evidence for a variety of phenomena, analyses and claims, de-
pending on the way it is used. In EXPOsOMICS, it was indeed used as evidence 
for the study of different phenomena, including: as molecular evidence for ex-
posure; as evidence for health states of a population; and, as part of geo-spatial 
models, to produce further evidence for the environment the cohort could have 
been exposed to. This is at odds with the idea that evidence should be classified 
on the basis of the method with which it is produced. Collection methods do 
play a crucial role for the evidential value of a dataset, but they do not deter-
mine it on their own. Another important feature of data practices in 
EXPOsOMICS is that the evidential content of a specific type of data is deter-
mined by the mobilisation and use of other types and sources of data. This is 
particularly noticeable in the case of environment data, where the evidential 
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value of the initial dataset (postcodes) is determined through the mobilisation 
of various other sources of data. 
I argue that these features point to a general approach to evidence, where con-
siderations about evidence are indeed determined by the data collected and 
retrieved in specific projects like EXPOsOMICS. Yet, what plays a crucial role 
is not just the intrinsic properties of a dataset (such as its origin, type, content, 
format, etc.), but rather the ways in which the dataset is used, fits into research 
questions and is mobilised and put in relation with other datasets. 
This approach to evidence is also reflected in researchers’ reactions when asked 
about the classification of data as mechanistic evidence. One researcher said 
that he would find it necessary to perform various further experiments and 
have other types of data, for molecular data to be used as mechanistic evidence. 
His way of framing mechanistic evidence closely linked classification to the 
context of use of data. For example, he pointed to research in the metabolomics 
literature, published in Nature Medicine (Wang et al. 2011). In this work, Wang 
and colleagues first identified molecules that were correlated with cardiovas-
cular disease through omics analyses of metabolites. However, the data pro-
duced in this way was not used as evidence of mechanisms. In order to test the 
presence of mechanisms underlying associations and thus whether the metab-
olites were rightfully predictive of the disease, researchers carried out further 
tests, including animal studies. It was only as a result of the mobilisation of 
these other sources of data that researchers claimed they had managed to link 
molecules both to an external exposure (a dietary source) and disease, thus 
granting the use of their molecular data as mechanistic evidence. In the words 
of one EXPOsOMICS researcher: 
Through all these different experiments – and you can tell, a Nature 
paper is only two sides, but it brings together lots and lots of work 
–, using these, they were able to show the dietary source, phospha-
tidylcholine (which is found in meat, eggs, etc.) and they were able 
to link it all the way though to these metabolites and also show these 
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metabolites directly caused atherosclerotic, as the blood vessels are 
directly linked to cardiovascular disease. (Researcher B1) 
What I am arguing here is not that a definition of mechanistic evidence closer 
to Wang and colleagues’ work is superior to the RWT. Rather, I am pointing 
out that views of what counts as a specific kind of evidence can vary signifi-
cantly and depend on the context of use of data as evidence. Therefore, what 
counts as a type of evidence may shift considerably and clear-cut distinctions 
between pieces of evidence, as if these were inherently different entities, seem 
too strict. The kind of evidence a dataset may provide is not determined ex 
ante, and it rather depends on the heterogeneous ways in which data is used 
and disseminated across different sites. 
The problem of the RWT approach is that it does not seem flexible enough to 
accommodate this attitude to evidence classification, as the way in which evi-
dence is classified according to the RWT is based on a view of evidence as 
something that is produced in a form which makes it of a specific and stable 
kind, more precisely either difference-making or mechanistic evidence. This 
approach seems to overlook the context of data practices, where considerations 
about what counts as evidence actually take place in practice; and more gener-
ally, questions on the relation between data and evidence do not seem to be 
considered in the RWT framework. In this context, the work of Illari (2011a) on 
specifying the notion of mechanistic evidence is particularly significant, as it 
moves away from a classification based on evidence-gathering methods to-
wards a distinction based on what we use evidence for. This is close to my 
argument, but Illari also argues that evidence should be defined on the basis of 
its ‘object’. For instance, a piece of evidence is mechanistic evidence insofar as 
it has the existence of a mechanism as its object. As such, Illari’s view seems 
similarly based on a view of evidence as something with a fixed and represen-
tational content, which – I have argued – does not hold in the context of the 
data practices of exposome research. 
 Evaluating Evidential Pluralism in Epidemiology: Mechanistic Evidence in Exposome Re-
search 
 108 
4.5 Exposome Research and the Core of the 
Russo-Williamson Thesis 
The case of exposome research presents a number of challenges to the concep-
tual framework of the RWT. On the basis of the critical remarks of the paper, 
what should we make of the evidential pluralism proposed by the RWT? As 
we have seen, discussions on causal inference in the health sciences are the 
main context of the RWT. The RWT is a claim about what we need to know to 
make causal claims. The arguably most important and controversial element 
of the thesis – its core idea – is that production is a necessary aspect for inferring 
causality and that we need to know about production when making causal in-
ferences. This productive component is framed in terms of mechanistic evi-
dence. 
The core of the RWT seems to grasp an idea that is in general terms shared in 
the health sciences, including exposome research. EXPOsOMICS researchers 
often commented on their work saying that it is mostly focused on getting in-
formation about dependences between variables, but knowing what lies in be-
tween dependence relations makes a crucial difference and is the ultimate way 
of testing causal claims: 
And the ultimate way of validating your result and making sure that 
it’s something that is general is to understand the biology behind it. 
We’re not at this stage, but the ultimate way would be to do some 
mechanistic wet lab experiment, to understand the mechanisms. 
And, once you understand the mechanisms, then there’s no reason 
why there should be differences between one individual and an-
other. So that’s your ultimate way of generalising. (Researcher D1)  
How can we reconcile this intuition, at the core of the RWT, with the critical 
remarks made in the paper? The problem is how to interpret the claim on the 
productive aspect of causality. The RWT frames it in terms of a need for mech-
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anistic evidence. But does that mean that mechanistic evidence should be pro-
duced when causal claims are made, or is the use of mechanistic evidence 
enough? The RWT is not clear on this issue. 
If we take it to mean that mechanistic evidence has to be produced, the thesis 
seems too strong and hard to maintain in many lines of research in the life sci-
ences. For instance, in exposome research and other areas of epidemiology, it 
seems often difficult to identify mechanisms and mechanisms are not always 
the focus of research. At the same time, we will probably want to say that epi-
demiologists can make causal claims, even if no mechanistic evidence is pro-
duced. Many public health policies are based on epidemiological studies where 
no mechanistic evidence seems to be produced. For example, environmental 
epidemiologists are often concerned with determining air quality standards, 
that is measurements of how much air pollution we can and should tolerate.48 
Public health policies on these standards are developed on the basis of epide-
miological studies about, say, the relation between ambient air pollution and 
the incidence of cardiovascular disease, often with no primary focus on mech-
anisms. We will probably want to say that these polices are based on causal 
claims of some sort, as knowledge of causal relations is usually considered to 
provide among the best justifications for effective policy interventions (see e.g. 
Cartwright 2011). Hence, requiring mechanistic evidence to be produced, each 
time causal claims are made in the health sciences, seems problematic. This 
suggests that the core of the RWT should be rather interpreted as the need for 
use, rather than production, of mechanistic evidence. 
At the same time, it is important to stress that, in exposome research and epi-
demiology more generally, new studies are designed, data is analysed and re-
 
48 Projects like EXPOsOMICS, which focuses on air pollution and water 
contamination, are precisely funded with the aim of gathering evidence for 
updating and revising these standards. 
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search is shaped (also) on the basis of mechanistic knowledge. When environ-
mental epidemiologists assess, for instance, associations between air pollution 
and cardiovascular disease, background knowledge on potential mechanistic 
pathways linking the two phenomena plays an important role. However, in 
cases such as exposome research, evidence of mechanisms often comes from 
research in other areas of the health sciences. This suggests an interdisciplinary 
interpretation of the thesis. So far, most of the examples used in the literature 
on the RWT come from single disciplines and/or single projects in the life sci-
ences. Yet the thesis can be interpreted to apply on a higher level: some disci-
plines may provide evidence for the probabilistic angle of causal inference, 
whilst others may provide the productive one. In this view, one could say that 
a project like EXPOsOMICS provides some of the evidence that is necessary to 
put together to solve the puzzle of disease causation. Other kinds of evidence, 
possibly including evidence of productive causation, may need to be provided 
by other disciplines and lines of research. This interpretation would take into 
account my characterisation of evidence classification in the previous section, 
and especially the need for mobilising various lines of evidence for data to be 
used as evidence. As such, the thesis would allow to interpret epidemiology as 
contributing in part to explanations of disease that, in the long run, may be 
mechanistic, without running the risk of ‘over-interpreting’ all disciplines or 
lines of research in productive or mechanistic terms. In other words, in this 
view one may be able to say that exposome research provides hints at mecha-
nisms without having to say it produces mechanistic evidence.49 
 
49 Personally, I find it more charitable to say that epidemiological research 
on the exposome is more than an instantiation of research intended to describe 
a mechanism, because it can potentially inform mechanistic research but pro-
duces evidence that is also important on its own.  
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This interpretation of the RWT on the basis of my critical remarks might be a 
promising project. Still, a few problems remain. One problem concerns the nor-
mativity of the thesis. Whilst this interpretation of the thesis would pose 
weaker requirements on single disciplines or lines of research, the claim on 
mechanistic evidence may still be too strong. Namely, in some areas of the 
health sciences, researchers might be tempted to make a causal claim even if 
they do not have mechanistic evidence and before carrying out research aimed 
at discovering underlying mechanisms. For example, in the aforementioned 
case of the epidemiological discovery of the relation between smoking and 
lung cancer, the mechanism was discovered long after the initial causal claim 
was made and the initial smoking bans were enforced (Gillies 2011). A second 
and related problem is the notion of mechanistic evidence, which may not be 
the best way of framing the need for the productive component of causality. In 
disciplines like epidemiology, mechanisms are indeed used to shape research. 
However, more than evidence of mechanisms per se, it is rather knowledge of 
mechanisms that is used to guide research. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The central object of research of this paper has been data practices and ways of 
classifying and framing evidence in epidemiology, with particular reference to 
research on the exposome. The principal issue I have dealt with is the extent to 
which the RWT can be applied to this line of research. 
I have cautioned against the claim that the use of molecular evidence can be 
considered as providing mechanistic evidence as defined by the RWT. I have 
shown that, in the EXPOsOMICS project, molecular evidence has been used for 
claims about the difference that exposures make, in contrast with the notion of 
mechanistic evidence proposed by the RWT. Then, I have focused on another 
aspect of the RWT, i.e., the way evidence is classified and distinguished be-
tween different kinds. On the basis of a reconstruction of data practices in 
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EXPOsOMICS, I have shown that, in contrast with the RWT, there are substan-
tially different views and approaches to what counts as a type of evidence. Fi-
nally, I have looked back at the core of the RWT from the perspective of my 
case study and critical remarks, and I have proposed an interdisciplinary and 
use-based interpretation of the thesis. 
This interpretation takes into account the critical points I have raised in the 
paper. Additionally, it tries to push the thesis forward, towards a direction 
where it is capable of accounting for the use of data as evidence in current re-
search and can therefore make fitting suggestions on the consideration and ap-
preciation of a plurality of medical evidence.50 I have pointed to some aspects 
of the core of the thesis, and the interpretation that I have put forward, that 
need further review and consideration. It also remains to be seen to which ex-
tent these considerations are applicable in other areas of epidemiological and, 
speaking more broadly, health science research. Another related issue concerns 
how the integration of evidence from different sources, produced through dif-
ferent methods and mobilised through different pathways, is and should be 
carried out – a topic that has recently been discussed in the literature, but has 
yet to be explored in the context of epidemiology.51  
 
 
50 In this sense, see also the work on evaluating evidence of mechanisms by 
the EBM+ consortium (Parkkinen et al. 2018).  
51 See the special issues of Synthese on “Evidence Amalgamation in the Sci-
ences” (e.g. Bertolaso and Sterpetti 2017) and Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences on “Integration in Biology: Philosophical Perspectives on the Dynam-
ics of Interdisciplinarity” (Brigandt 2013). 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Outlook  
This dissertation set out to discuss the collection, integration and use of data in 
the context of epidemiological research on the relation between exposure and 
disease. My main research question concerned the ways in which data prac-
tices inform and sustain the subject matter of the epidemiology of the expo-
some. I have investigated the conditions under which data is retrieved, col-
lected, integrated and used as evidence for scientific claims, connecting the 
context of data practices with material, technological, institutional and rhetor-
ical components. In this way, the three central chapters of this dissertation con-
verge into an account of scientific practices about data, that is positioned in the 
local context of epidemiological research as well as broader philosophical dis-
cussions on the life and health sciences. 
I pursued my research questions by examining data in contemporary research 
on the exposome, an all-encompassing approach to the understanding of the 
ways in which exposure shapes health of human populations. I have taken 
EXPOsOMICS, an EU-funded project that studied the effects of air and water 
pollution on chronic disease, as the main empirical focus of my dissertation. I 
have employed a qualitative case study approach, based on the analysis of doc-
uments, reports, presentations and publications and a series of qualitative in-
terviews and participant observation that I have carried out with researchers 
in the EXPOsOMICS project. I have used exposome research as a case study of 
research that:  
• is centred around the integration of data of significantly different types, 
about health and environment, collected in experimental and observational 
studies, at the macroscopic and microscopic level;  
• employs interdisciplinary teams and approaches, which include molecular 
biology, medicine, statistics, geography, information science, etc.;  
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• is considered highly innovative as it is built around the development of new 
concepts, methods and technology; 
• and deals with issues at the intersection of health and environment, thus 
with significant political, social and economic consequences.  
As a result of my analysis of exposome research, I argue that one of the epis-
temically salient features of data is that it can sustain the subject matter of epi-
demiological research by shaping notions and concepts, approaches and strat-
egies, techniques and technologies and what counts as evidence. In the case I 
have studied, this epistemic role played by data is enacted by the ways in 
which it is used by epistemic agents and communities. As a consequence, the 
epistemic role of data in exposome research is connected to and mediated by 
other artefacts, components and features of the scientific inquiry.  
In particular, in the central chapters of the dissertation I have claimed that: 
• The scientific innovations of the exposome should be framed as the estab-
lishment of a repertoire, as opposed to a paradigm, in which various con-
ceptual, social and material components are aligned. The exposome reper-
toire consists in many components transferred from other areas of the life 
and health sciences. Scientific change is a result of this alignment, and it is 
not due to only one of these factors, such as data (Chapter 2). 
• In the context of data practices in exposome research, researchers use evi-
dential claims to specify the evidential and representational value of their 
datasets. Three epistemic strategies for evidential claims can be distin-
guished, differing in terms of level of abstraction, lines of work and type of 
evidential claim and leading to a picture of evidence production as epis-
temic-intensive labour (Chapter 3). 
• Philosophical views on how to distinguish and classify evidence in health 
research, such as the Russo-Williamson Thesis, fall short in the way they 
have been applied in exposome research. New types of data collected and 
analysed in exposome research are not used as mechanistic evidence of the 
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kind maintained by the thesis. Exposome research suggests a different ap-
proach to classifying evidence and different ways of interpreting the thesis 
(Chapter 4). 
To conclude, I would like to point to some issues that I have discussed in vari-
ous parts of the dissertation and collect in one place the claims I have made in 
the chapters of the dissertation. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss: 
the philosophical significance of epidemiology; the relations between data and 
other components of scientific epistemology; scientific change and innovation; 
the role of technology; notions of evidence; and conceptualisations of health 
and disease. I will also present an outlook of my research, pointing to evidence 
and health and disease as topics that could be considered for future research.  
As I have often mentioned in the dissertation, epidemiology has started to re-
ceive attention by philosophers of science only very recently. In this disserta-
tion, I hope to have shown that epidemiology is an interesting area of research 
from a philosophical viewpoint. I think that epidemiology is especially inter-
esting for philosophical questions about the role of integration in the life and 
health sciences, i.e. integration of methods, technologies, data and theoretical 
commitments of diverse communities, disciplines and lines of research, and 
about the nature of contemporary scientific research that intertwines political, 
epistemic and societal dimensions. I hope to have given a perspective on some 
of these issues in this dissertation, where I have engaged in a data-centric phil-
osophical study to understand, document and account for the conditions in 
which data is used in the context of contemporary research. I have discussed 
these and other general features of my dissertation in Chapter 1, where I have 
positioned my work in the context of academic debates in philosophy of sci-
ence and science studies. I have discussed the broad, interdisciplinary debate 
on the role and effects of data in various processes and activities of modern 
societies, including the sciences; and, more specifically, what I have called 
data-centric studies in philosophy of science, looking at the epistemic role of 
data and data practices in the sciences. I have specified my research by intro-
ducing the philosophical scholarship on data in the life and health sciences, in 
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order to explain and justify the reasons why I have chosen to pursue a study 
of data in the context of the exposome. I have finally connected my project to a 
recent turn in philosophy of science, as a consequence of which philosophers 
have started to give more attention to the study of scientific practice and have 
argued for the need of empirical grounding through methods from the social 
sciences. I have used this discussion to introduce the methodology I have used 
during the research for this dissertation, including case study and qualitative 
interviews.  
In Chapter 1, I have argued that data is to be considered as one of the (many) 
material and epistemic artefacts that are produced by scientists throughout 
their research. I have argued that an epistemology of science focused on scien-
tific practices should discuss the epistemic role of these artefacts and the rela-
tion between them, including data, methods, models, evidence, claims, theo-
ries, knowledge, etc. In this dissertation, I have focused on scientific data and 
have discussed relations between the context of data practices and some of 
these artefacts, including theoretical commitments, knowledge claims and ev-
idence. I have started my analysis of these relations by discussing the back-
ground and wider context in which the exposome has emerged as a new con-
cept in the last decade of epidemiological research. In Chapter2, I have inves-
tigated the conditions under which the exposome was conceived, developed 
and established. I have used Ankeny and Leonelli’s (2016) conceptual frame-
work of ‘repertoires’ to highlight the role of non-conceptual components and 
make sense of the ways in which material, financial, institutional and techno-
logical elements are aligned in exposome research. I have shown that many of 
these factors were transferred from other areas of the life and health sciences, 
including: the sequencing repertoire, which emerged in the genomic context 
and has since then increasingly spread in the life and health sciences; exposure 
science, which studies human contact with various external, chemical agents; 
and biomarkers research, i.e. an approach that studies elements or characteris-
tics that can be precisely measured and used as indicators of various processes. 
This analysis has led me to a nuanced account of change and innovation in the 
context of the exposome, as I have argued that forms of innovation include 
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non-theoretical components of the repertoire and are to be seen in continuity 
with traditional and longstanding approaches in the field. Questions on change 
and innovation have been explored in other chapters of the dissertation. In 
Chapter 3, I have given a close look at data practices in EXPOsOMICS and ar-
gued that different epistemic strategies have arisen to collect, analyse and use 
new sources of data as evidence. In Chapter 4, I have focused more specifically 
on the use of molecular data on the internal component of the exposome, and 
I have explored claims according to which the use of this type of data provides 
a new kind of evidence for epidemiology. As I explained in Chapter 1, data 
studies have often pushed back against views ascribing revolutionary epis-
temic powers to the use of large datasets, by looking at specific contexts of data 
use. My analysis goes in the same direction: the account of scientific change 
that can be drawn from the dissertation suggests that innovation is the complex 
result of the alignment of various components of a line of research, thus push-
ing back against the view that only one component – data – could be responsi-
ble for paradigmatic changes. 
Discussions on scientific innovation are often connected to analyses of the role 
of technology in recent scholarship on scientific research. In the dissertation, I 
have discussed technology as a form of innovation when analysing material 
and technical components of the exposome as a repertoire, in Chapter 2, where 
I have connected the origin of technologies used in exposome research, such as 
omics, to other areas of life science research, such as genomics and sequencing. 
In Chapter 3 I have presented an account of data practices in the EXPOsOMICS 
project, highlighting the specific approaches and techniques used to collect, re-
trieve and analyse data for the study of the exposome and how assumptions 
and commitments connected to different techniques are integrated. I have ar-
gued that evidential claims are employed at various points of data practices in 
exposome research in order to specify and identify the datasets used in re-
search. I have used evidential claims as a conceptual tool to provide a distinc-
tion between different types and levels of data practices in EXPOsOMICS. I 
have shown how different epistemic strategies have arisen in this case: the 
macro strategy, which identifies the initial evidence platform and generates 
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scoping claims that restrict samples and provide an initial understanding of 
phenomena; the micro strategy, which collects data of significantly different 
types to generate evidential claims on structures at the microscopic level; and 
the association strategy, which uses evidence from the two other strategies to 
generate evidential claims at the statistical level of associations between expo-
sure to the environment and outcomes of interest. In Chapter 4, I have focused 
more explicitly on omics technologies used in EXPOsOMICS, as way of ana-
lysing views of molecular data as providing mechanistic evidence. On the basis 
of a close look at the ways in which molecular data is used in exposome re-
search, I have cautioned against interpretations in terms of mechanistic evi-
dence. I have shown that new types of molecular data collected and analysed 
in EXPOsOMICS do not necessarily yield mechanistic evidence of the kind 
maintained in current philosophical classifications of evidence. 
Evidence is one of the topics that I have discussed the most throughout the dis-
sertation. Chapter 2 is based on the notion of evidential claims, for which I have 
taken inspiration from recent work in the philosophy of archaeology (Wylie 
2017; Chapman and Wylie 2016) and that I have taken to mean implicit or ex-
plicit claims that identify a dataset as evidence for something, this being a phe-
nomenon or a claim. I have used this conceptual tool to distinguish between 
different strategies, that I have emphasised as a crucial step of research, where 
datasets are given evidential value and representation content, which differ in 
terms of level of abstraction, type of work and kind of evidential claim and are 
ways of dealing with the diversity of techniques used for data generation. In 
Chapter 4, I have analysed approaches to evidence classification in exposome 
research and compared and contrasted them with philosophical views on evi-
dence classification such as evidential pluralism. I have argued that current 
philosophical views on evidence classification in the health sciences fall short 
in the ways in which they have been applied in exposome research. In current 
philosophical discussions on evidence in the medical sciences, epidemiology 
has been used to exemplify the view referred to as the Russo-Williamson The-
sis (Russo and Williamson 2007, 2012), according to which evidence of both 
difference-making and mechanisms is produced to make causal claims. I have 
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addressed the conditions under which data is categorised as evidence in expo-
some research and argued that the variety of data used as evidence in expo-
some research suggests a different approach to classifying evidence, indicating 
that what counts as a type of evidence depends on the ways in which a dataset 
is used, in contrast with the approach of evidential pluralism, according to 
which evidence is classified in different types on the basis of its intrinsic prop-
erties. In the chapter I have sketched an alternative approach to this view, ar-
guing that evidence is rarely classified as a specific kind that shows distinct 
features and what counts as evidence, and more precisely as a specific type of 
evidence, depends on the purpose for which the data is used.  
I think that the dissertation could serve as a platform for more in-depth explo-
ration of an account of evidence in biomedical research. In the epidemiological 
context that I have looked at in the dissertation, evidence appears to be a prag-
matic and relational notion, a category that is assigned to specific sets of data 
depending on the way they are used and for what they are used. This would 
entail that classifications of evidence depend not only on the data itself but also 
on the ways in which the data is used and for which claims it is used. The ap-
proach would be in contrast with more traditional views of evidence, which 
tend to be representational (Woodward 2000) and closer to philosophical work 
on scientific data, by suggesting a relational interpretation of evidence (Leo-
nelli 2015).  
Exploring this account would be especially interesting in the health sciences. 
In this context, data and evidence have both been linked to the future of re-
search, often in a way that suggests that the two terms are equivalent. An ap-
proach such as evidence-based medicine is usually presented as a way of opti-
mising and advancing decision-making in medical practice. Much of the recent 
philosophical work on evidence developed in the context of the health sciences 
is connected to the rise of evidence-based medicine, which brought about new 
ways of assessing sources of evidence and tackling evidence amalgamation 
and provoked many critical reflections in the literature. Within this debate, a 
number of authors have started to think in more general terms about the kinds 
of evidence produced in medical research, connecting these discussions to 
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other issues of philosophy of science, such as explanation, causation and causal 
inference (Campaner and Galavotti 2012). This line of research has successfully 
emphasised the need for a wider consideration of medical evidence, by show-
ing the importance of types of evidence that are poorly considered within the 
evidence-based medicine framework, for instance in the context of causal in-
ference (Clarke et al. 2013). Yet, in this context philosophers have not really 
engaged with data and its relation with evidence. The fact that the concept of 
data does not play much of a role in discussions on medical evidence seems 
odd, as similar promises about revolutionising biomedical research have been 
connected to the use of data, especially in the context of large quantities and 
new sources of data, such as omics data or personal health records, and the 
increasing implementation of data-intensive approaches (e.g., systems medi-
cine, personalised and precision medicine). At the same time, from the point of 
view of philosophical accounts of data, evidence has been discussed as the re-
sult of practices of collecting, ordering and use of data for claims about phe-
nomena (Leonelli 2009; Leonelli 2016a). Here, the emphasis placed on data en-
tails that anything that counts as data and is operationalised in knowledge 
claims is evidence. A potential follow-up project on these issues could thus 
look at: the relations between data and evidence and the conditions under 
which data is given evidential value and content, possibly in connection to ev-
idential claims, as discussed in Chapter 3; and the relations with other elements 
of the scientific inquiry, including empirical claims, models and knowledge 
(see e.g. Leonelli 2019. 
Another set of issues to which results of my work can be applied to is the con-
ceptualisation of health and disease in contemporary life and health sciences. In 
Chapter 2, I have discussed the innovations of the exposome in the context of 
other debates on change in these disciplines, including postgenomics. I have 
used the term postgenomics here with a historical meaning, i.e. as a way to 
describe research that employs genomic-based technologies, is increasingly 
aware of the complexity in interpreting genomic results and has a critical en-
gagement with gene-centric approaches. Investigating the relations between 
data and conceptual changes in the exposome repertoire, I have argued that 
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current changes in epidemiology should be framed as alignments of various 
conceptual and material components: scientific change is the result of this 
alignment, and it is not only due to one of these factors, such as data. I have 
argued that the exposome should not be analysed only as a notion, at the con-
ceptual level, nor as a methodological approach, nor for its technological con-
sequences – it should rather be considered as the alignment of these and other 
components, which as a whole constitutes a repertoire. Using this approach, I 
have considered some conceptual implications of the exposome repertoire, pri-
marily in the context of notions of exposure and environment. Something that 
could be discussed in more depth are the ways in which health and disease are 
conceptualised in the exposome repertoire and what consequences this can 
have on how health and disease should be accounted for and explained. For 
example, one of the aspects of the exposome that I have often mentioned in the 
dissertation is the all-encompassing approach of the exposome, which is aimed 
at capturing all the exposures experienced by individuals throughout their life-
time. In the exposome literature this is connected to an approach referred to as 
‘course of life approach’, whereby disease or health appear as outcomes of in-
terest for analysis in a continuum and sets of states in which the exposome can 
be in (Robinson and Vrijheid 2015). This seems close to recent discussions in 
philosophy of science on process-oriented views of organisms, as opposed en-
tity-oriented views (Nicholson and Dupré 2018). In this sense, an avenue for 
further research could be an exploration of postgenomic approaches to disease 
and health, on the basis of processual instead of entity-based terms, possibly 
also in relation to discussions on pathways and mechanisms (Boniolo and 
Campaner 2018) and disease states as points to be tracked in a continuum 
(Russo 2017). 
The project would imply engaging with theories and accounts of disease, that 
are a longstanding and traditional debate in philosophy of science and philos-
ophy of medicine. Concepts of disease and health have attracted the attention 
of philosophers not only for the fundamental and basic role they play in med-
ical research and care, but also because of specific conceptual features. The dis-
tinction between what counts as health and disease state is famously vague, as 
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a consequence of the diversity of human populations and therefore experiences 
of disease, the (debated) social construction of many conceptualisations of dis-
ease, the uncoupling of care and disease and the fact that interpretations of 
health and disease usually involve both normative and descriptive elements 
(Reiss and Ankeny 2016). Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, the philosophical lit-
erature on these issues is very extensive (Cooper 2016). It includes accounts 
based on the distinction between pathological and non-pathological states, the 
distinction between functional and dysfunctional biological systems, norma-
tive accounts that have looked at disease as an instance of harmful and natu-
rally bad states, etc. (Murphy 2015).  
The issues discussed in this debate are significant for the epistemology and 
ethics of health sciences research and health care, as distinctions between 
health and disease have an impact on what can, should and is studied in med-
icine. At the same time, however, I think that a follow-up project based on the 
approach used in this dissertation, looking at the conceptual level as situated 
in material and social dimensions, would push against some of the limitations 
of this debate. Firstly, a significant part of the debate does not seem to take into 
account scientific practice as other areas of philosophy of science do and is in-
stead mostly focused on conceptual analysis. It could be argued that is a sensi-
ble choice, especially if the aim is to build a normative account for philosophi-
cal audiences, but an analysis of scientific practices around the conceptualisa-
tion and operationalisation of disease states could be relevant to the debate, as 
I have argued is the case when looking at the exposome. In addition, in the 
debate the perspective of a discipline such as epidemiology is rarely discussed. 
This seems rather odd, considering that epidemiology is usually defined as the 
discipline that studies health and disease in populations (Broadbent 2013) and 
provides significant evidence for policy-making on public health, as we have 
seen in the dissertation. If, for instance, we compare the health and disease de-
bate with the ways in which disease in epidemiology and exposome research 
is framed, studied and discussed, there seem to be some disparities. The phil-
osophical debate seems to be mostly focused on ‘internalist’ perspectives, and 
the role of environmental factors is usually not taken into account significantly. 
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However, we have seen that the exposome is pitched to counter gene-centric, 
internalist and biological approaches to disease because 70-80% of disease risks 
are due to changes in the environment (Rappaport and Smith 2010). Similar 
remarks can be extended to a lack of attention given to the social and socio-
economic dimension of disease, which rarely seems to appear in the philosoph-
ical debate on these issues (see Ghiara and Russo under review).  
By connecting my case to these other debates and issues, I hope to show the 
merits of a philosophical study centred on real-life, scientific practices of data 
collection, integration and use. In Chapter 1, I have defined this as the line of 
research in philosophy of science that is concerned with questions about the 
relations between data and cognitive and material elements of scientific prac-
tice and epistemology; focuses on data and data practices broadly construed, 
with units of analysis including data collection, processing, structuring, order-
ing and use as evidence; and aims at the documentation, critical engagement 
and philosophical interpretation of data. The dissertation is a contribution to 
this line of research, as I have been concerned with a number of issues dis-
cussed in data-centric philosophical studies of the sciences, including: innova-
tion and novelty in science, in relation to the epistemic role of data in shaping 
the conceptual, material and technological context; the production of evidence 
in material and immaterial contexts, in relation to the ways in which data is 
considered and used as evidence; and the classification of evidence in different 
types of evidence, in relation of the assumptions, practices and uses that are 
involved in evidence classification. In addition, I have connected these discus-
sions with topics of more general interest in philosophy of science, such as: 
approaches to and conceptualisations of scientific change, in the context of 
Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian discussions; causality, causal claims and causal 
knowledge in biomedical research; and evidential reasoning in the sciences, in 
relation to philosophical analyses of empirical knowledge. I hope that this dis-
sertation contributes to our understanding of data, as an epistemically salient 
component of the sciences. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Ethics Consent Form  
Title of Research Project 
The role of data and technology in contemporary biomedicine: Integrating ev-
idence to study the relation between disease and the environment 
Details of Project  
The project aims to study: the theoretical approach to disease developed in 
EXPOsOMICS; the ways in which the different sources of evidence and data 
are used and integrated; the ways in which the project was set up and the level 
of interdisciplinarity involved; and the use and influence of technology on re-
search.   
Contact Details 
For further information about the research and interview data, please contact: 
Stefano Canali, Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz University Hannover, Am 
Klagesmarkt 14-17, 30159 Hannover, Germany. 
Tel: +49 0511 762 14505. Email: stefano.canali@philos.uni-hannover.de.  
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss 
with someone else, please contact: 
Professor Sabina Leonelli, Co-Director of Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life 
Sciences, Department of Sociology, Philosophy & Anthropology, Exeter Uni-
versity, Exeter, UK. 
Tel: +44 01392 725137. Email: s.leonelli@exeter.ac.uk. 
Participation in the study 
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I will ask you about your everyday research practices, your experiences with 
data integration and technology, the organisation of the project and its theoret-
ical and methodological aspects. The interview will range from thirty minutes 
to two hours in duration. I would like to record this interview with your per-
mission.  
Data Protection Notice 
Your contact details will be kept separated from your interview data. It will be 
kept for up to 10 years so that, if necessary, I can contact you during my re-
search.  
No voice or video data will be published or shared in any way. Interviews will 
be transcribed in an anonymised form. Anonymised data (transcripts) may be 
stored indefinitely. 
Other than me, the only persons with temporary access to the recordings will 
be my supervisors and eventual academic co-authors. 
The information you provide will be used for research purposes and your per-
sonal data will be processed in accordance with current data protection legis-
lation and the University's notification lodged at the Information Commission-
er's Office. Your personal data will be treated in the strictest confidence and 
will not be disclosed to any unauthorised third parties. The results of the re-
search will be published in anonymised form. 
Open access  
After the interview, I will also ask you whether you are happy for me to make 
the eventual interview transcript available as open access research data. This 
is optional and disconnected from the question of anonymity. You can choose 
to be identifiable and at the same time for the transcripts not to be shared, or 
conversely, to not be identifiable but for anonymised versions of the transcripts 
to be made available. In any case, your contact details will be kept separately 
from your interview data. 
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Research findings 
I will be happy to send you the transcription to review as well as any publica-
tions resulting from this study. 
Consent 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project. 
I understand that: 
• there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project and, 
if I do choose to participate, I may withdraw for a month after the inter-
view; 
• I can stop the interview at any time;  
• I do not need to answer any questions that I do not wish to answer; 
• any information which I give will be used solely for the purposes of this 
research project, which may include publications or academic confer-
ence presentations; 
• if applicable, the information, which I give, may be shared with the su-
pervisors of the project and potential co-authors in an anonymised form; 
• all information I give will be treated as confidential; 
• the researcher will make every effort to preserve my anonymity. 
I agree to be audio-recorded: Yes ____ No ____ 
Name of participant: ________________________________________________ 
Signature of participant: __________________________ Date: _______________ 
Signature of researcher: __________________________ Date: _______________ 
[2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each] 
To be completed after the interview, only if desired by the participant: 
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I __________________________ give permission to be identified and have my 
contributions attributed to me. Yes ____ No ____ 
I agree for the interview transcripts to be edited and shared in an open access 
format that will make it freely accessible online. Yes ____ No ____ 
Signature of participant: ____________________ Date: ____________________ 
Signature of researcher: ____________________ Date: _____________________ 
[2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each] 
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